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Yojana Miraya Oscco 
 
This research focused on the forms and structure of customary political organization in 
Quechua indigenous communities of the Peruvian Andes that extend from the villages to 
their associated migrant communities in the capital. As the mining industry has been 
expanding rapidly throughout the Andes in recent decades, describing the political 
organization of these remote communities is a key aspect of their negotiation practices 
with these external industries. This research was conducted utilizing grounded theory in a 
comparative case-study format by analyzing two villages and their associated migrant 
communities from the Andean District of Juan Espinoza Medrano. This research utilized 
a mixed-methods approach by conducting over 70 semi-structured interviews and 186 
household surveys. Results indicated that there exists a unique form of direct democracy 
involving indigenous political organization in the villages and associated migrant 
communities in the capital. Indigenous political organization is used for land 
management, delegation of duties, relations between the associated migrant communities 
and villages, and has had a direct effect on negotiations with the mining companies, even 




that mining operations have had a substantial effect on the customary political 
organizations, community, and local economy by undermining the ability of villages and 
migrant communities to effectively work together as before. This primary finding 
suggests that there is a strong connection (politically, economically, socially and 
culturally) between the associated migrant communities in Lima and their villages, and 
there is a need for the villages to extend the geographic scale of negotiation for new 
mining operations to the surrounding villages and their associated migrant communities 
in order to avoid disagreements, which can be a detriment to all stakeholders involved. 
Additionally, as the Peruvian government has shown limited interest in regulating 
international mining companies, it is crucial to develop negotiation processes in the 
future that include the associated migrant communities, the villages, and their forms of 
indigenous political organization to make the decision-making process more transparent, 
open, democratic, beneficial, and acceptable to all stakeholders. This would not only 
strengthen the government's capacity for proper regulation, it would also reinforce the 
importance of indigenous political organization and the sustainable communal land 
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Introduction   
This research focuses on Quechua indigenous communities of the Peruvian Andes 
and their forms of political organization that extend from the villages (pueblos) to 
migrant communities in the capital (locales) and dramatically affect local and national 
environmental politics. Political organization in indigenous Quechua villages of the 
Andes is a historic practice that exists to this day. This type of organization has governed 
everything from law and order, to land, water, and other natural resource rights. Now, as 
mining operations are expanding throughout the Andes, it is important to understand 
whether and how these forms of political organization aid communities in negotiating 
terms with mining companies. In addition, as many members of indigenous villages have 
migrated to the capital Lima in the past three to four decades, these urban migrants play 
important roles in modern indigenous political organization through their participation in 
both national and local politics (Peattle, 1990). These strong political ties between rural 
villages and urban migrant communities are important, because at this time mining 
companies supported by the state are seeking access to communally held lands in the 
Andes. How communities are organized politically will determine their ability to define 
the terms of mining company access to their lands.  
The purpose of this research was to understand what challenges and opportunities 
indigenous communities face in order to organize politically, and specifically, what forms 
of organization can, in the long term, support their self-determination and autonomy. This 




mountain communities, including their migrant members living in the Peruvian capital 
Lima. The connection between urban and rural areas in the political organization of these 
communities was a highly important part of the analysis for my research because some 
villages are more connected with urban areas than others. I suspected this has some 
influence on the extent of their political influence in mining politics regionally, and I 
wanted to perform this case study comparison to see to what degree this is true. To this 
end my research questions were as follows:  
1. How are Quechua indigenous communities organized politically, specifically in 
the district of Juan Espinoza Medrano? 
2. Does indigenous organizing help communities to negotiate regional mining 
agreements and control processes of development in their communities?   
3. How does mining affect political organization? 
4. How does political organizing between villages and migrant communities affect 
community response to mining? 
Chapter 1 begins by reviewing the literature on indigenous studies and debate 
surrounding indigenous identity, customary indigenous political organization as it relates 
to Quechua communities, common land management and tenure systems and their 
relationship with migrant communities in the context of neoliberal economic policies. 
Chapter 2 provides a brief background history of the Andes since colonial times focusing 
on Quechua land tenure systems, and how the political organization of the indigenous 
people and the struggles and resistance against the Spanish influenced indigenous land 




the villages of Calcauso and Mollebamba where this study took place. Finally, there is a 
brief history and explanation of mining in Peru as it relates to the villages of this study. 
In Chapter 3, I discuss the methods used to explore my research questions. I 
applied a mixed method pattern of data collection including 70 interviews and 186 
surveys, which I performed in the villages and in Lima in 2017. Questions focused on the 
current mining industry, political organization, and indigenous identity.  Chapter 4 covers 
the quantitative and qualitative results of my data collection and analysis by focusing on 
both thematic coding to analyze my interviews and a combination of SPSS and Google 
Sheets Statistics to correlate my surveys with my interview data. In Chapter 5, I present 
my results and discuss them with reference to the literature review. Finally, Chapter 6 
details the limitations I encountered in the execution of this study, ideas and suggestions 
for future research, and a conclusion. I hope this research will identify existing strategies 
and provide new strategies of successful political organization that can help these 






Chapter 1: Literature Review 
This literature review focuses on customary indigenous organization among the 
Quechua and the challenges they face in the modern era of resource extraction.  The main 
themes discussed are indigenous studies, customary indigenous political organization, 
and neoliberalism’s effects on mining operations. These three themes provide a 
framework to explain in detail how they relate to this study including indigenous identity, 
politicization of indigeneity, informal and formal organization, local autonomy, moral 
economy, migrant communities, communal land management, and specific effects of the 
former president of Peru, Alberto Fujimori’s economic policies. This review provides the 
basis for my analysis of villages, their urban allies and networks that create the web of 
power relations in these indigenous communities. In order to understand the political 
organization of the indigenous people practiced through millennia in the current context, 
it is important to acknowledge how the sense of community has been reproduced in urban 
areas and how this relationship affects the decision-making process in the villages.  
Much of the research concerning the Quechua focuses on their geographical 
indigenous identity, social movements, and the effects of globalization and neoliberalism 
on their traditional livelihoods (Radcliffe and Laurie, 2006; Contreras, 1987; Greene, 
2006, De la Cadena, 2010, Laats, 2000; Bury, 2005, Arce, 2008, Lucero, 2009). In recent 
decades there has been a renewed interest in these remote areas, especially with a focus 




traditional Andean livelihoods as they existed before, during, and after colonization 
(PACCPERU, 2011; Cordova, 2015; Yates, 2015). However, very little research has 
focused on political organization in Quechua communities and how it relates to dynamic 
connections between urban spaces and rural areas (PACCPERU, 2011). A review of 
previous indigenous studies on the Quechua people helps to establish the uniqueness of 







The field of Indigenous Studies is broad and encompasses many peoples, 
languages, cultures, time-periods, and modes of human living (Coates, 2003). Many 
authors have defined and discussed key concepts underlying indigenous studies (Holm, 
Pearson, and Chavis, 2003; Lee, 2006; Alfred and Corntassel, 2005; Minde, 2008; 
Stoyanova, 2009). Here I will briefly review some of these definitions and theories and 
explain why I used the peoplehood model to discuss indigeneity in this research. 
Definition of ‘indigenous’ 
The definition of the term indigenous people has been a subject of major debate 
between scholars (Coates, 2003). Defining indigenous identity is complex and important 
because determining who ‘counts’ can affect the future political struggles of indigenous 
people. International organizations such as the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, etc. have 
defined “indigenousness” in a specific legal way with certain criteria while still allowing 
for indigenous peoples to self-identify as indigenous or not (United Nations, 2004). To 
some authors, these criteria are too narrow, because they marginalize groups that do not 
fit the definition exactly, denying them fundamental protections and rights as indigenous 
peoples (Minde, 2008; Stoyanova, 2009; Lee, 2006). 
While the UN may have good intentions in their recognition of indigenous 




Western manner of top down legal definition can generate discomfort among indigenous 
people (Alfred and Corntassel, 2005). Indigenous people are still part of modern nation-
states and the world economy that is confronting massive economic, social and 
environmental problems globally. Some indigenous studies scholars are trying to develop 
a new holistic framework to approach the concept of indigeneity with more 
inclusivity.   Lee (2006) for example, described indigenous people using two definitions. 
First, people who faced invasion and conquest from 1492 onwards. Second, a group of 
indigenous people who claim to be indigenous in the modern world, but who have largely 
been identified through shared agricultural social structures for a majority of their history. 
These approaches emerging from anthropology attempt to explain the challenges of 
indigenous people in current systems as indigenous people are increasing their visibility.  
 
Most researchers relate indigenous identity to their land and history, but still there 
are debates to find a holistic approach to determine indigenous identity. The problem 
with definitions that place people in different categories is that they are static. It is 
important to acknowledge that indigenous identities can change over time. One of the 
integral ways to approach indigenous identity is based on the concept of peoplehood 
developed by Holm, Pearson and Chavis, (2003). The authors argued that indigenous 
identity consisted of four factors: land, sacred history, spiritual bond and language. They 
expanded upon these elements to generate an explanation and foundation of 
“peoplehood” through a “functional matrix” model which incorporated four factors: “the 




This concept can permit us to understand and revalidate many Quechuan communities as 
indigenous through these criteria as they relate to South American indigeneity within the 
wider academic debate on indigeneity in general. This can help bring more rights and 
proper legal recognition to these communities as they are still largely classified by the 
government as peasant communities.  The debate about indigenous people and how 
indigenous should be defined will continue in academic debates. However, as Lee (2006) 
stated, “...the fact remains that, politically and socially, nationally and internationally, the 
concept of indigenous has become a powerful tool for good. After centuries of 
denigration, being recognized as indigenous has become an avenue for entitlement, 
enfranchisement and empowerment” (Lee, 2006, p. 458). 
Indigenous identity  
This controversy over how indigenous should be defined is important for the 
identity struggle of indigenous people in Latin America. For centuries, indigenous people 
have struggled over the name campesino, “peasant”, and today there are new validations 
of the term “indigenous” by state governments (Puente Valdivia, 2014; Yashar, 1998; 
Tockman, 2016). 
In the Andes, indigenous identity emerged in Inca times though scholars still 
debate and speculate about the economic structure of Inca civilization and “…whether the 
Inca were socialist or feudal, a welfare state or one with ‘patriarchal’ slavery…” (Murra, 
1961, p. 47). Furthermore, some Peruvian authors debate how the Inca state was 




a different form than was used in Europe and the Orient (Lumbreras, 1989; Baudin, 
Woods & Goddard, 1961).  
With the Spanish conquest the Inca civilization was destroyed and corrupted by 
the Spanish as recorded by well-known indigenous author, Felipe Guaman Poma de 
Ayala in his 1615 manuscript on the Andean civilization, the conquest by Spanish and the 
abuses and exploitation of the indigenous people in colonial times.  (Olson, & Casas, 
2015; Guamán Poma de Ayala  and Frye, 2006).  Other authors have written about this 
time and the effects on indigenous people in the Andes (e.g. De la Vega, 1985).  
Indigenous identity has been under attack in Peru since the time of the Spanish 
Conquest.  Over time, many indigenous people migrated to the city in order to pursue 
economic opportunities and escape from the difficult situations that existed in the 
mountains such as tribute and mita (a colonial system that required Indians to work 
forced labor such as working in the mines). Once indigenous people engaged in the 
Spanish monetary economy, they were susceptible to changing their indigenous identity 
just to be accepted in society (Henderson, 2013).  This process of change of indigenous 
people and their identity in modern times is well explained in the literature of indigenism, 
specifically in how indigenous writers approached their own identity at the time 
(Archibald, 2011; Coronado, 2014). 
Indigenous identity in the Andes was heavily discriminated against during 
Colonial times, but now this same identity is guaranteeing new rights, “poverty 
alleviation and empowerment policies” in today’s modern politics (Radcliffe, 2006, p. 




Americas seem to be on a positive upswing in terms of their identities, and this seems to 
be having a positive effect on their political success and mobilization (Yashar, 1998). 
Sociolinguistics of Quechuan Identity 
It has been claimed that, “Indigenousness is an identity constructed, shaped and 
lived in the politicized context of contemporary colonialism” (Alfred and Corntassel, 
2005, p. 597). Further, Hornberger and Mckay (2010, p. 8) in explaining Kroskrity’s 
(2004) fifth axiom of language ideologies stated that, “Language ideologies are major 
determinants of social and cultural identities”. Taking both of these statements, one from 
the field of Sociolinguistics and the other from the field of Indigenous Studies, the 
tremendous influence of the term “indigenous” over conceptions of society becomes 
clear. The term is not only constructed politically, its very use influences our languages 
and ultimately our discourse in society. Moreover, our identities profoundly affect the 
languages we speak, and the languages we speak help determine our identities. While the 
concept of identity has been adopted readily by some indigenous people, especially 
activist groups it is also, rejected by others., Thus the term identity has been a source of 
continual discussion, concerning indigenous politics in Peru (Yashar, 1998; Oliver-Smith, 
2012; Greene, 2006; De la Cadena, 2010; Strobele-Gregor, 1996; Garcia, 2003; Varese 
1996; Radcliffe & Laurie 2006; Bebbington, Bebbington, Bury, Lingan,  Muñoz, and 
Scurrah  2008). Because of the centuries-long conflict involving the Quechua language 





Politicization of indigeneity 
There seem to be to two major arguments over the term “indigenous” in current 
literature. One says that this term is being reconstructed in a positive light that is uniting 
many underprivileged people under a common banner and history, this in turn helps their 
political organization and motivation. As Radcliffe and Laurie (2006) explained 
concerning the connection between modern-day development and identity in the Andes,  
“Andean development with identity provides a regionally specific example of the 
broad culture and development paradigm. In these new approaches, indigenous 
cultures once seen as an obstacle to social and economic development have become 
central to poverty-alleviation and empowerment policies”. (Radcliffe & Laurie, 2006, 
p. 237).  
According to this line of argument, the once demeaned indigenous cultures of the 
Americas have been in the process of reclaiming their identities, which has had a positive 
effect on their political success and mobilization. However, this has not always been the 
case. Other authors claim that as cultural identity was often forced on indigenous peoples, 
even the modern label of “indigenous” or “aboriginal” by governments has politically 
charged legal implications. According to Alfred and Corntassel, (2005) 
...this identity is purely a state construction that is instrumental to the state’s 
attempt to gradually subsume Indigenous existences into its own constitutional 
system and body politic...‘aboriginalism’ is a legal, political and cultural 
discourse designed to serve an agenda of silent surrender to an inherently unjust 
relation at the root of the colonial state itself  (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005, p. 598). 
 
The terms have been constructed and used by governments in an effort to create 
an exclusionary dichotomy between indigenous and non-indigenous. This, of course, has 
significant political implications, both for how indigenous people are perceived by non-




Peasant or indigenous 
Indigenous identity has been altered in different countries in Latin America by 
changing indios to “peasants” (Burt & Mauceri, 2014; Bordais, 2016; Yashar, 1998). As 
mentioned in chapter 2, agrarian reforms in Peru that have been taking place since the 
arrival of the Spanish have influenced the identities of the indigenous inhabitants of these 
areas dramatically. Particularly since the reforms of the Velasco government in 1967, as 
Yashar (1998) explained, “...these reforms obliged Indians to define themselves as 
peasants, particularly if they hoped to gain access to state resources. Official political 
discourse promoted assimilation into mestizo culture and extended resources to rural 
citizens insofar as they identified and organized as peasants” (Yashar, 1998, p. 33). 
When Velasco’s land reforms came, many indios became campesinos under the 
law in order to receive certain economic and political benefits from the State such as land 
ownership and voting rights (Yashar, 1998).  Thus, this change of identity was directly 
linked to political opportunity and social mobility. Interestingly, this identity change has 
now almost been reversed, especially by indigenous leaders who are attempting to 
reclaim an identity that was self-detrimental for so long, and turn it into something that 
provides more rights, protection, and opportunities (Canessa, 2006). As communities 
continue to organize themselves around legal terminology that serves their best interest, 
language and identity are continuing to play a major role in Quechua political 
organization. This is evidenced by the many communities that still organize in the 





Customary Indigenous Political Organization 
Informal and formal organizations 
The social structure of Quechua communities in Peru has a large impact on their 
forms of political organization and eventual social movements. As mentioned previously, 
the social structure of these communities includes the family, the village (pueblo), and 
the local (the community of village migrants that live in the capital). These structures 
constitute what Pejovich (1999) calls “informal institutions”, which are different from 
state-approved “formal institutions” like municipalities and government agencies. 
The distinction between informal and formal political organization in rural communities 
is important. As Pejovich (1999) states, “Some communities are dominated by informal 
rules. We call them “traditional” communities” (Pejovich, 1999, p. 172). Furthermore, 
Helmke and Levitsky (2004), give a great working definition for both formal and 
informal institutions. They see, “...informal institutions as socially shared rules, usually 
unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned 
channels. By contrast, formal institutions are rules and procedures that are created, 
communicated, and enforced through channels widely accepted as official” (Helmke & 
Levitsky, 2004, p. 727).  
These definitions are further elaborated on by Helmke and Levitsky (2004) who 
divide the various informal institutions into four categories based on how much their 
desired outcomes align with the formal institutions that exist in that community. Using 




organization in each community. The four categories of informal political organization 
are shown below in Figure 5.  
As is visible, the institutions are separated into those that are “divergent” and 
those that are ”convergent” where the latter is more aligned with government interests 
and the former is more against government interests. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) further 
separate these informal institutions into those that are operating under an “effective” or 
“ineffective” government as this will affect how the informal institution operates. Thus, a 
“competing” informal institution would be operating in a climate of little government 
effectiveness and a divergence of political thought between the local people and the 
government. This could be seen as a protest, resistance, or even revolutionary movement 
or organization. An “accommodating” informal institution would be one that is being 
forced to capitulate their autonomy to a different but effective government. The 
community still has differing views from the government though they now must find a 
way to work with the government to preserve their own interests. A “substitutive” 
informal institution is one that is aligned with the government interests though they are 
operating under an ineffective government, thus they often act as substitutes for the 
government by providing basic services or organization. Finally, there are 
“complementary” informal institutions that operate under an effective government and 
share the government's plan of direction, this means they help the government advance 




Table 1:  Helmke and Levitsky (2004) 
Outcomes Effective formal institutions Ineffective formal institutions 
Convergent Complementary Substitutive 
Divergent Accommodating Competing 
 
These definitions help relate to my term of political organization in those two 
communities, pueblos and locales, as different types of informal organizations according 
to how they are able, or unable, to empower communities in relation to their response to 
outside economic actors (e.g. Nonprofit organizations, mining industry, state regulations, 
etc.). Pejovich (1999) developed a theory called the interaction thesis, which states that as 
economic opportunities enter new areas, the acceptance of those activities by the informal 
and formal institutions in society affects the ability of that industry to develop and 
survive (Pejovich, 1999, p. 171). This theory will help provide a framework to test the 
economic viability of the different forms of political organization that exist in these two 
communities.  
Francis Cleaver (2001) developed these arguments further with an idea he called 
“bricolage”1.  Cleaver suggested that instead of having rigid denominations of groups 
such as those suggested by Pejovich (1999) it would be better to see these categories as 
holistic, multi-faceted, and interchangeably working together. Cleaver (2001) argued that 
many communities, especially indigenous peasant communities due to their unique 
                                                 
1 “Bricolage consists of the adaptive processes in which people inscribe configurations of rules, traditions, 
norms and relationships with meaning and authority. In so doing they modify old arrangements and invent 
new ones but innovations are always linked authoritatively to acceptable ways of doing things” (De Koning 




context, often exhibit multiple aspects of these classical political descriptions. Cleaver 
specifically stated that, “...this is (a) false dichotomy and that local resource-use practices 
and management arrangements are likely to be a complex blend of formal and informal, 
traditional and modern” (Cleaver, 2001, p. 29). This makes the idea of bricolage an 
excellent complement to those of Pejovich (1999). 
Furthermore, Ostrom (1990; 2008) in analyzing common pool resource (CPR) 
management specifically focused on institutional analysis of the context of resource 
management as communities responded to their environment based on their own 
institutions and rules. She claimed that these unique rules created by successfully 
managed CPRs work in some places, but not necessary in other places (Ostrom, 2008). 
The idea of peoplehood (Holmes et al., 2003) discussed above helps to bring into focus 
the value of these different roles and institutions for the indigenous communities that are 
the focus of this research. This study attempted to address this complex network of 
institutions. 
Local autonomy and self-determination 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People considers 
indigenous people as autonomous nations with self-determination.  Article 4 states that, 
“Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self- determination, have the right to 
autonomy or self-government in the matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as 
well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.” (United Nations, 





The degree of local autonomy that a region receives is determined by many 
factors and can have various outcomes, both positive and negative. Some of the negative 
aspects of local autonomy can be local abuses or corruption that cannot be controlled by 
the central government. It can also include the local ambitions that some community 
members may have, causing deep-seated competition and rivalry among families. 
Moreover, increased local autonomy can cause friction between the national and local 
governments, which may slow development of infrastructure, education, police, and other 
state institutions (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). However, local autonomy is also a vital 
concern for many of these communities as they have organized their own forms of local 
governments for many centuries.  
Forms of local autonomy include democratic elections of local authorities, 
communal decisions, and a shared understanding/expectation that all community 
members have a responsibility to serve the community without any salary (Mainwaring, 
& Shugart, 1997). The administration and development of local autonomy historically 
has had a huge impact on communities, because it allowed everyone to participate and 
serve the communities based in their own territory. As Laats (2000) explains, “With 
respect to self-government, it seems that the peasants form a micro political unit that 
corresponds with the will of the majority of their inhabitants” (Laats, 2000, p. 11). In this 
sense, the inhabitants of these communities organize themselves to defend and advance 
their own interests making local autonomy a crucial aspect of their political bargaining 




economic, and sociocultural connection that is maintained with the migrants from each 
village that go to work or study in another city, mainly Lima. 
Migrant Communities 
The various organizations of migrants in Lima (Asociacion de Comunidades 
Migrantes) come from all provinces of Peru and play an important role in creating 
cultural spaces in the urban areas of the city. They provide a much needed recreational 
outlet in addition to their function as a political organization which aims at being an 
intermediary between the migrants and the often complicated institutional bureaucracy 
(Golte, & Adams, 1987). As Wagner and Fernandez-Gimenez (2008) added that, 
“...social capital increases the likelihood that a collaborative effort will succeed (Wagner 
& Fernandez-Gimenez, 2008, p. 325). Thus, the collaboration between individuals and 
families in the rural villages of Peru may indeed have a large effect on the social capital 
they bring with them to Lima as migrant communities.  
Urban migration in Peru started in the 1940s and increased in the 1980s due to the 
terrorist movement of the Shining Path. This decade saw a rise in the migration from 
rural areas to the city where mostly indigenous people migrated and were exposed to 
discrimination and abuse.  In many cases this helped cause the loss of their ethnic identity 
(Heredia, 2016; Starn, 1992; Burt & Mauceri, 2014). Migrant communities coming from 
rural areas to the city face many challenges in adapting to the capital (Kirk, 1991; Starn, 
1992).  As individuals, migrants from the Andes are extremely marginalized.  The 




lack of basic services, poverty, marginalization, racism, etc. (Solari & Jorge, 
2008).  Migrant communities, for example, usually arrived on the periphery of Lima and 
were known as “invaders”.  This word refers to the invasion, or land claimed for 
settlement by many individuals at once. (Peattle, 1990) describes for example, “A group 
of between 80 and 100 families [that] decided to organize a land invasion. They had 
already organized an invasion two years previously, but eventually they had been 
removed by the police” (Peattle, 1990, p.21).  
With such extreme poverty and discrimination, many migrants have difficulty 
finding jobs that pay a decent wage. Many migrant women are pressured to work as 
housekeepers facing extreme racism, discrimination, and even slavery-like conditions 
working in houses without much pay, while migrant men are often exploited on 
construction job sites, as cart-carriers, janitors, and other types of manual laborers (La 
Prensa, 2015).  These occupations, especially housekeeping, only permit one day of rest 
per week, on Sunday.   
Thus, Sunday is an important day for these communities as everyone comes from 
all their jobs and other locations in the city to the locale to have meetings, eat food, enjoy 
cultural activities, and sports events. Sunday is a day where many of these individuals 
finally feel empowered. After being in a state of marginalization all week, in the locales 
they can speak with friends in their own dialects, feel like an equal, make political 
decisions about their communities and villages, and participate in meaningful cultural 
activities helping maintain a connection with their origins.  According to Agnew, Shelley, 




social interaction; location, or place located in geographical space; and sense of place, or 
attachment between people and place” (Agnew, Shelley, & Pringle, 2003, p. 605-606). 
This makes locations such as the locale very important for communities, 
especially ones that are as marginalized and closely-tied together as the migrant 
communities of Lima. Providing a space for consistent and effective political 
organization coupled with an area for cultural festivities, sports and more helps create a 
“locale” with enormous political and economic potential based primarily on “social 
capital”. 
Communal-based Land Management 
Communal land management consists of communities governing, managing, and 
utilizing their lands based on agreed communal need. It exists and has existed for many 
dozens of centuries. In order to discuss the ideas surrounding communal-based land 
management it is necessary to define a few concepts that are used often in this field of 
study so I can establish how it will relate to the framework of this thesis. “‘Enclosure’ 
refers to the process of commodifying new aspects of human life in a way that catalyzes 
broader transformation in communities and social relations. Historically, the term 
referred to the privatization of common village lands” (De Angelis, 2004 as cited in 
Grandia, 2012, p. 4). According to Grandia (2012) the first phase of ‘enclosure’ is usually 
the physical and legal takeover of land through land titling then the second phase is the 
ultimate cultural and social acceptance of such practices which are antithetical to village 




stop directly, while the second one is more subtle and difficult to detect and resist. The 
identification of the phase that the communities of this study find themselves in is 
important because it will help predict the future stages of enclosure they are likely to 
witness as well as provide concrete ways to resist the negative effects of such changes.  
Part of the first phase that Grandia (2012) identifies includes a change in the land 
tenure system through a process of privatization. This privatization can take place legally, 
or through other means, and has the effect of removing lands that were once part of the 
commons, usable by all based on land management practices, and placing them in the 
hands of private individuals. This means that land tenure, or who inherits land and how, 
is a very important gauge as to whether or not land is held in common or privately. 
Common pool resources and land tenure 
According to Elinor Ostrom (2008), communities develop institutions to manage 
common pool resources (CPR).  Her research indicates that successful CPR systems’ 
institutions commonly share eight similar “design principles” (Ostrom, 2008, p. 28). 
These eight characteristics include: (1) defining clear group boundaries, (2) matching 
rules governing use of common goods to local needs and conditions, (3) ensuring that 
those affected by the rules can participate in modifying the rules, (4) making sure the 
rule-making rights of community members are respected by outside authorities, (5) 
developing a system, carried out by community members, for monitoring members’ 
behavior, (6) using graduated sanctions for rule violators, (7) providing accessible, low-




common resource in nested tiers from the lowest level up to the entire interconnected 
system (Ostrom, 2008 p.28). The question of who helps create and maintain the 
institutions that members live by and how they are enforced is thus of major importance 
for CPR. For this investigation the primary characteristics that were of major importance 
for discussion purposes were the first seven design principles.  
According to Ostrom (2008), the effectiveness and robustness of institutions is 
increased where extensive norms have developed over time as a collective choice. By 
pointing to various examples of CPR throughout the world, mostly fisheries, she 
dismissed the idea that people always act as selfish individuals or that all selfish decisions 
are inherently rational (Ostrom, 2008). Thus, even in areas such as the villages of this 
study, people often have the use of and responsibility for shifting plots of land while 
maintaining only small amounts of what would be considered “private” property in that it 
can be legally titled.  
Loss of the moral economy, marginalization, and primitive accumulation 
As neoliberalism is largely concerned with economics it is important to review the 
literature concerning traditional economics in Quechua communities. The concept of the 
“moral economy” is very important for understanding Quechua societies because it has 
helped govern and shape the development and function of markets as well as political 
organization. The moral economy concept was originally put forward by James Scott 
(1976) and is described by Paul Robbins (2012) as “...social systems of mutual assistance 




to...certain forms of redistributive rent, where a proportion of their harvest is lost in 
sharecropping and taxation” (Robbins, 2012, p. 62). These forms of communal 
organization have helped create a favorable climate for political organization. 
Communities are accustomed to local political organization because they know each 
other intimately, work together on a regular basis, and largely administer their villages on 
their own.  This has been a tremendous benefit for modern communities that are 
confronting issues of marginalization, “primitive accumulation”, and the environmental 
conflicts related to mining operations.  
 The processes of primitive accumulation and marginalization results in a loss of 
moral economy, a critical component of traditional rural societies. Jim Glassman (2006) 
tells us that, “Primitive accumulation is for Marx, first and foremost, the ‘historical 
process of divorcing the producer from the means of productions’, transforming, ‘the 
social means of subsistence and of production into capital and immediate producers into 
wage laborers’ (Glassman, 2006, p. 610). According to Glassman (2006), primitive 
accumulation can occur in many ways including “forcible usurpation of common 
property”, “enclosures of the commons”, and “proletarianization”. All of these forces are 
at work in the communities directly and indirectly affected by mining operations, 
including the Quechua community. Above all, processes of primitive accumulation not 
only “divorce the producer from the means of production” as Marx says, but also serve to 
divorce the producer from the morals of production. Indeed, without risk of being too 




be noticed on a global scale as people become more conscious of corporate and 
governmental abuses against poor and marginalized people.  
According to Robbins (2012), marginalization can occur in a society when 
“Otherwise environmentally innocuous production systems undergo transition to 
overexploitation of natural resources on which they depend as a response to state 
development intervention and/or increasing integration in regional and global markets” 
(Robbins  2012, p. 21). This marginalization is directly connected to a change in 
economic modes of production and a change of the economic mentality of a people.  
The economic and social changes that come because of these changes often create 
environmental conflicts, or as Robbins explains: 
...increasing scarcities produced through resource enclosure or appropriation by 
state authorities, private firms, or social elites accelerate conflict between groups 
(gender, class, or ethnicity). Similarly, environmental problems become 
“politicized” when local groups (gender, class, or ethnicity) secure control of 
collective resources at the expense of others by leveraging management 
interventions by development authorities, state agents, or private firms (Robbins, 
2012, p. 200). 
 
This description encompasses many of the economic processes that have been at work in 
Quechua communities since the arrival of the mining industry in Peru in Spanish colonial 
times.  In the district of this study, Juan Espinoza Medrano (JEM), issues of 
marginalization, primitive accumulation, and environmental conflict all combine to make 
this region a candidate for a study on the effects of neoliberalism on indigenous political 




Neoliberalism’s Effects on Mining Operations 
Economic neoliberalism and mining 
Another major debate that has been taking place across many relevant disciplines 
(e.g. political science, ecology, environmentalism, business, geography), is the discussion 
of neoliberalism and its potential effects on mining ventures (Bury, 2005; Arce, 2008; 
Lucero, 2009; Holden & Jacobson, 2007). First, a distinction should be made here 
between “globalization” and “neoliberalism”, as the two terms are often used 
interchangeably. For the purpose of this study, globalization is the process of a global 
movement of people, ideas, products, information, and money with many cultural, 
economic, social, political, and historical factors (Haarstad & Floysand, 2007). 
Neoliberalism is an economic and political ideology that is concerned with deregulating 
market controls worldwide and decreasing the amount of government welfare support for 
social services2 (Jessop, 2002). As Haarstad and Floysand (2007) explicitly state, we 
should not risk 
...making the assumption that globalization is in itself corporate control and 
equating globalization with neoliberal economic ideology, and falling into a 
binary polemic over the desirability or destructiveness of globalization. We argue 
that the view of globalization as inherently empowering multinational 
                                                 
2 As a new economic project oriented to new conditions, neoliberalism calls for: the liberalization and 
deregulation of economic transactions, not only within national borders but also—and more importantly— 
across these borders; the privatization of state-owned enterprises and state-provided services; the use of 
market proxies in the residual public sector; and the treatment of public welfare spending as a cost of 
international production, rather than as a source of domestic demand. As a political project, it seeks to roll 
back “normal” (or routine) forms of state intervention associated with the mixed economy and the 
Keynesian welfare national state (or analogous forms of intervention in the developmental state or socialist 
plan state) as well as the “exceptional” (or crisis-induced) forms of intervention aimed at managing, 
displacing, or deferring crises in and/or of accumulation regimes and their modes of regulation in Atlantic 




corporations ignores the more complex restructuring of social, political, and 
economic processes (Haarstad a& Floysand, 2007, p. 290) 
 
Indeed, Haarstad and Floysand (2007) argue that the forces of globalization (i.e. 
the spread of new ideas, technology, trade, and culture worldwide) could potentially be 
highly beneficial for social movements, political organization, and even local autonomy. 
This is in contrast to those who see globalization as a process of centralization of power. 
This ongoing debate is interesting and this case study of villages and migrant 
communities in the Andes should provide more information about the effects of 
neoliberalism on mining operations.  
Since the 1990’s, mining operations worldwide have largely benefited from the 
expansion of neoliberal policies (Jessop, 2002; Bury, 2005; Arce, 2008; Lucero, 2009; 
Budds & Hinojosa, 2012). These policies have allowed for more ready access to lands 
across the world, many of which are lands of low-income peasants, often held 
communally, who have few options to resist when a large mining corporation, 
government agencies, and social workers arrive in these areas to convince them to permit 
the development of the mine (Jessop, 2002). This has caused different forms of 
acceptance and resistance to mining throughout the world (Bebbington et al. 2008; 
Jessop, 2002).  
Neoliberalism's effects on mining under Fujimori in the Peruvian Andes 
The problems associated with the neoliberal expansion of Fujimori during the 
1990’s have been well documented and discussed (Bury, 2005; Arce, 2008; Lucero, 




neoliberal economic politics of the Fujimori regime permitted the entrance of the mining 
industry into the Andes using the discourse that the mining industry would bring 
development to these poor regions of Peru. However, as a result of many of these 
reforms, called Fujishock or “shock therapy” by Fujimori’s government, the poorest 
people of Peru often suffered worst (Bury, 2005). As Bury explains, “The results of 
Fujimori's reforms have been significant. The Peruvian economy is now dominated by 
the private sector, regulated by market forces, and intricately linked to the global 
economy” (Bury, 2005, p. 223). Consequently, there have been increases in economic 
activity, foreign investment, and international exports. However, Bury maintains that 
many of the poorest in Peru have benefitted very little. “Overall, despite some advances 
in economic growth and increasingly positive assessments of macroeconomic growth 
rates in the country, poverty rates have either declined very little or have actually 
increased during the past decade” (Bury, 2005, p. 223). Aside from this, many of the 
approaches used by mining companies in these regions have caused division and social 
conflict in the communities where they operate. As a result, international economic 
pressure has had a strong impact on the changes to the economic system in Peru by 
allowing the entrance of international corporations with new regulations since the 1990’s 
in order to promote more investment. Furthermore, the environment and traditional 
livelihood of peasant indigenous communities have been jeopardized throughout the 
Andes due to these changes, which have included the lack of control of the laws and 
operational normativity by the centralized government and have often created 




A study by Zoe Williams (2012) into the prevalence of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) tactics by mining companies in Peru revealed that CSR campaigns 
are often used to obtain initial approval of the mining operations by the community. 
Williams (2012) discovered that the more organized a community was, the better they 
were able to make demands on the mining company regarding their CSR. This 
organization is important because during moments of contention between the mine and 
the communities in this study, Williams (2012) found that, “…CSR was used to defuse 
conflict without adequately addressing its underlying causes… [And] has functioned to 
buy off communities (or community leadership)” (Williams, 2012, p. 87-88). This is a 
concern that this study attempted to address by highlighting and examining the 
community conflicts that have arisen in the villages and locales of this study since the 
entrance of the mining companies. 
There are many examples of the effects of mining throughout Peru, but 
specifically the Province of Apurimac has the highest percentage of this investment 
(33%) and is simultaneously one of the country’s poorest regions (Sosa, Boelens & 
Zwarteveen, 2017). One well-known case in Tambogrande demonstrates not only some 
common themes found in most mining areas throughout Peru, but it also provides this 
research with a critical question to answer about political organization and the 
“...geographical scale for the voting process” that should be instituted in communities 
before mining is accepted (Muradian, et al. 2003, p. 775).  
In Tambogrande, Peru the Canadian mining company Manhattan Minerals Corp. 




Due to large public opposition (85%) to the mine because of a lack of consultation and 
consensus-building, a large local protest movement had reached its climax with a group 
of people vandalizing some mining equipment. One of the protest leaders, Godo Fredo 
Garcı´a Baca, was assassinated not long after by unknown gunmen in return. Eventually 
the Peruvian government and various other NGOs, like CONACAMI (National 
Confederation of Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining), and Oxfam got involved 
in the conflict to try and form a resolution (Muradian, Martinez-Alier & Correa., 2003). 
Muradian et al.  (2003) make the case that in order to avoid these types of conflicts in the 
future mining companies must consult with local communities in a participatory fashion.  
Consulting in a participatory fashion includes open discussion in community 
assemblies and allowing a public referendum on the issue of mining by the people whose 
land and livelihoods will be affected. The question that Muradian et al. (2003) then pose 
for future research is: what should the geographical scale of the voting process be? In this 
thesis, I have tried to address some of the issues around the participation of migrant 
communities and surrounding villages in the consultation and referendum process of the 
mining companies in JEM. This debate over the benefits versus the negative 
consequences of neoliberalizing economies, mining opportunities, and a globalized 
culture will continue for the foreseeable future. The profound implications and role of 
globalization and neoliberalism in the Quechua political organization are important for 





As this literature review indicates, information is lacking about the relationship 
between migrant communities and their home communities, how they are politically 
organized and how they have responded to outside influences seeking to extract 
resources.  This research illuminates the relationship between two mountain communities 
and their urban migrant counterparts and their differential responses to overtures from 
mining companies. It addresses the following research questions: 
1. How are Quechua indigenous communities organized politically, specifically in 
the district of Juan Espinoza Medrano, Apurimac? 
2. How does mining affect political organization? 
3. How does political organizing between villages and migrant communities affect 
community response to mining? 
4.  Does customary indigenous organizing help communities to negotiate regional 




Chapter 2: Background and Context  
The Andes in South America is the longest continental mountain range in the 
world. This has caused great geographical challenges for both the Incan Empire which 
expanded to the modern countries of Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile and Argentina 
and for all subsequent societies. This study focuses on communities that live in the 
mountains of the province of Apurimac, which means "where the gods speak" in the 
Quechua language. It is located on the eastern slope of the Cordillera de los Andes with 
the highest altitude of 3,952 m (12,966 ft). The ancient society in this area was adapted to 
this physical environment and they created innovative economic, political, and social 
connections between the jungle, the coast and the mountains of Peru.  
Andean History 
Colonial times  
In colonial times, though these communities maintained some of their own local 
political organization, they suffered many forms of colonial oppression including “forced 
labor” in the mines (Frye, 2006, p. viii). In these areas there are still places where mining 
has existed since the Spanish ruled, where indigenous people were exploited and never 
received any payment, such as the silver mine at Potosi (Frye, 2006). There is also 
evidence of various forms of abuse and discrimination against indigenous people such as 




Ayala, 1988). These types of discrimination were strongly embedded in the society of 
this time and many prejudices have continued until today due to this factor.  
According to Laats, (2000) who did a prolonged study of the communal lands of 
Cusco, there is a long history of policies under which indigenous people had limited 
participation in decisions made about the autonomy of their own lands. This 
discrimination can be explained through different stages of the history of land 
management in Peru. In the colonial period, the process of “reduction” of the Indians was 
introduced where small towns were created in order to facilitate the work of 
evangelization. In this process the Spanish conferred the land to communities with two 
ways of exploitation: collective and individual, in order to collect taxes for the corona 
(Spanish crown).  By the 19th century, Peru gained independence under Simon Bolivar 
who tried to eliminate many of the forms of colonialism in existence at that time by 
changing the system of communal land to private land, expecting that that would bring 
progress. This opportunity was taken advantage of by the elite classes of huge 
landowners because they were in a better financial position to benefit from the 
privatization of land (Laats, 2000). This would eventually cause its own problems of land 
management that Velasco’s government would attempted to reform in the 20th century, 





The history of agrarian reform.  
After the Constitution of 1920, the Peruvian state recognized the existence of 
indigenous communities into the national legal order and in 1933 the separate legal 
existence of the indigenous communities expired. In 1969, President Velasco initiated the 
agrarian reform and landowners become agrarian cooperatives and peasant communities, 
ignoring the social and cultural aspects of the communities, which were indigenous. The 
Constitution of 1979, the General Law on Peasant Communities 24656 and the Law of 
Demarcation and Titling of Communal Territory 24657 among others, regulated the 
legality, function, rights, and obligations of the communities (Laats, 2000).   
Eventually the term indio, created in colonial times, would be replaced with 
campesino (peasant) to align with the political structure of the Velasco government and 
his Agrarian Reform Program. According to Lourdes Bordais (2016), “The Agrarian 
Reform represents the first step towards a more just society in terms of equal 
opportunities and material security for those that demand it” (Bordais, 2016, p. 143). 
Before this reform, indigenous people were largely dependent servants working on 
regimens of latifundios, or large agricultural estates under Spanish landowners. On these 
latifundios indigenous people were still known, and degraded, as indios. When Velasco’s 
land reforms came, many indios became campesinos under the law in order to receive 
certain economic and political benefits from the state such as land ownership and voting 
rights (Yashar, 1998). Thus, this change of identity was directly linked to political 




While these reforms were passed under Velasco’s government, the real work of 
implementation was done by the government of Belaunde during the early 1980’s. In 
1982 the government expanded the agrarian reform and made the process more effective 
and attainable for average peasants (Laats, 2000). Finally, in 1993 a new constitution 
defined some of these lands as privately held (e.g. urban centers, house plots, nearby 
family fields) and some of these lands as communally held (e.g. road/waterways, 
communal agricultural land, pastoral land). This has encouraged some people from some 
communities to sell their land (Laats, 2000). Peru still maintains communal land. In 
today's context the titling of communal land is not complete and there are still some 
communities without official land titles (SICCAM, 2016; CEPES IBC, 2016).  
History of the political organization in Juan Espinoza Medrano  
The district of Juan Espinoza Medrano is one of the seven districts of the Province 
of Antabamba located in the department of Apurimac. According to the National Institute 
of Statistics and Information (INEI) (2007), the population of this district is 
approximately 1,975 inhabitants. This district contains six towns (Santiago, Santa Rosa, 
Calcauso, Vito, Silco and Mollebamba). Recently, there have been some conflicts 
between these towns since mining companies began working in Mollebamba.  
In the 1980s the terrorist group the Shining Path (sendero luminoso) created a 
large war and chaos in many parts of rural Peru. The Shining Path was a communist 
movement that started in the Andes with the objective of taking political power. To this 




their own political visions on the subject population. At the same time, the Peruvian 
military, which was sent to fight and kill the terrorists, also treated these same 
populations with abusive contempt when they arrived in towns that had been taken over 
by the Shining Path (Burt, 2006). There are many stories of abuses on both sides of this 
conflict that have had strong effect on the indigenous people’s way of thinking, many of 
them now have little trust for revolutionary movements or strong governments (Méndez, 
& Chipoco, 1988).  
The Shining Path was strongly against any kind of organization that was working 
with the formal political structure of the government during this time, which diminished 
much of the local political organization. At the same time there was extensive out-
migration towards the cities in search of better options. According to my surveys and 
interviews, the weakening of the customary indigenous political organization during the 
1980’s and 1990’s was partly due to the Shining Path insurgency. In these times they did 
not have a village president as this was not permitted, instead they had representatives 
called delegates (delegados) that worked as a type of authority for almost one year at a 
time. Many people left their villages in order to survive, and many authorities left the 
villages as well because nobody wanted to assume power due to the fear that the Shining 
Path might kill them. 
Migrant people from different regions that were affected by this socio-political 
conflict arrived in the cities and started new lives on the periphery of Peru’s cities, though 
mainly in the capital Lima. Here they lived in the most basic of conditions and they 




Unlike refugees who flee across borders, Peru’s internally displaced people ...go 
uncounted and unrecognized, unwanted reminders of a war most Peruvians would 
like to forget... many of them Quechua-speaking peasants suddenly forced to 
abandon their small farms to confront the racism, loneliness, and economic 
desperation of life in an urban shantytown (Kirk, 1991, p. 5). 
 
Later, they would establish associations, commercial conglomerates, organizations, clubs, 
etc. reproducing their communities throughout the city. Their experiences are detailed 
below. 
Geo-location of this Research 
 The populations for the basis of this study all come originally from the District of 
Juan Espinoza Medrano (JEM), which is located in the province of Antabamba, 
Apurímac at an elevation of 10872.7ft. JEM was officially recognized as a District with 
its capital of Mollebamba in 1942 with the towns of Calcauso, Silco and Vito within its 
limits3. Recently, in 2009 the community of Santa Rosa also joined the District of JEM 
(PACC PERU, 2011).  
                                                 
3 Latitude (lat): 14.0505 ° 45 ' 23.94179''S   

















Calcauso (Ccalccauso in Quechua, pronounced Khalkhauso) 
According to public registers, the community of ‘Calcauso’ is located in the 
district of JEM province of Antabamba, Apurímac at an elevation of 12122.7ft,4 and was 
officially recognized by Supreme Resolution on the 6 of April 1953. Its area consists of 
the central township and surrounding lands amounting to a total of 934.30mi² (Archival 
Document from Calcauso, 1987).  
                                                 
4 Latitude (lat): 14 ° 27 '0"S 






Figure 3 – Calcauso (Adrian Ccarapa, 2017) 
Mollebamba (Mollepata in native language) 
Mollebamba is the capital of the district of JEM, province of Antabamba, region of 
Apurimac located in the south of Peru located at 10498.69 feet above sea-level and 
encompassing an area of 433.82mi².5 The community of Mollebamba was first 
recognized in 1940 and obtained legal status on the 14 of November 1956 under their 
                                                 
5 Latitude (lat): 14°25'17"S 





first mayor Florentino Suarez Rea and was registered in the Property Register of Peasant 
Communities (Cordova, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 4 – Mollebamba (Photo of Mollebamba from Mapito.net circa 2012) 
Andean Geography 
According to the late Peruvian geographer Javier Pulgar Vidal (1981), Peru can be 
divided into seven natural regions, as seen in Figure 5, based on their altitude and climate. 
The District of JEM is located in the region of Quechua, while the migrant population of 





Figure 5 - Eight Regions of Peru  (Vidal, 1981). 
This diverse geography has played an important role for remote communities as it 
has enabled them to develop their own forms of autonomous political organization. 
Throughout history, the geography encouraged these remote communities to make strong 
connections both locally and with other regions of Peru in order to barter for regional 
products and crops (Contreras, 1987). Traveling merchants have conducted this regional 
trade since Inca times and were known as arrieros or muleteers. The arrieros not only 
traded goods, they were essential in the sharing of ideas. They brought news, new ideas, 
and inventions from other regions. Although these muleteers were largely indigenous 
during colonial times and before, according to Jesus Contreras, “...the muleteers played 
just as key of a role in politics” (Contreras, 1987, p. 50). As many muleteers were 
entrusted with important cargo loads and documents, they often had some knowledge of 
laws, finance, as well as contracts, and could thus help inform and direct their 




this area was based on barter and exchange products through the arrieros who have aided 
and enabled much of these communities’ ability to successfully organize politically. 
These different geographical regions of Peru were known as Tahuantinsuyo 
during the times of the Inca Empires, which means in Quechua ‘division in four regions’, 
thus this type of geographical division has a long history in Peru. In the Inca times, a tribe 
emerged called the Chancas, an ethnic group from Apurimac, which along with the 
Huancas from Junin, formed the principal enemy of the Inca empire before the Spanish 
arrived. In the time of the invasion of the Spanish, this ethnic group was allied with the 
Spanish (D'Altroy, 1987). According to Silverman (2003): 
How the Incas arose and came to conquer and administer this extraordinarily 
diverse region is one of the driving questions of Andean archaeology… in Inca 
myth, at least, the story begins with the Inca's surprise victory over an invading 
Chanca army, their mortal enemies at the dawn of the empire. The historicity and 
nature of Chanca society is a topic of major importance (p. 720). 
 
The residents of the villages and locales that this study focuses on are descendants of the 
chancas, so understanding a little bit about their history is important for context. 
Equally, the effects of the Spanish conquest of this vast Inca Empire are also 
important to briefly consider. According to (Belknap and Sandweiss, 2014, p. 1), because 
of the Spanish, “...conquest of the vast Inca Empire, they initiated profound changes in 
the culture, language, technology, economics, and demography of western South 
America”.  The invasion of the Spanish dramatically affected the culture and political 





The locales or associations of migrant communities in Peru are well known as 
associations that began to appear during the second half of the 1950s and early 1960s. 
They formed social and cultural spaces for migrants coming from the countryside to the 
city (Sevillano, 2016). This type of association between space and place plays an 
important role in the urban areas of Peru. Specifically, Agnew’s (1989) concept around 
“place” and “space” helps to clarify how the sense of place gives meaning to the often 
marginalized lives of migrants living in the urban areas through political organization and 
cultural activities. In this sense, migrant communities help create “reproduced 
communities” within these urban spaces. As an example of how the changing of place 
and space in a short time affected Peru’s makeup Higgins (1988) as cited by Heredia 
(2016) stated that,  
As peasants abandoned the land and flocked to the cities, Peru was transformed in 
the space of a few decades from a rural country into a predominantly urban 
society. The main focus of migration was, of course, the capital and by the 1980s, 
two-thirds of Lima’s population were migrants or children of migrants (Higgins, 
as cited in Heredia. 2016, p. 209). 
 
Presently, the migrant communities are usually located in the periphery of the city 
and are tightly knit and organized into Associations of Migrants (AoM) that connect each 
village and their migrant members that live in Lima and other larger cities around the 
country. Members typically share a strong interest in their hometown and have plans of 
returning someday to improve it and live there or simply to visit. The political 
organization aspect of the locale normally attempts to stimulate development in their 




migrants diffuse knowledge concerning Lima and the outside world and promote further 
contact between the city and village. With increasing migration, more formal steps may 
be taken to institutionalize aid to recently arrived migrants, previously available through 
kin and friendship ties, and the AoM may become a formal buffer between rural and 
urban life.  
Adapting to the language, culture, and climate of the capital when coming from 
the Andes can be very challenging, especially when one is already an extremely 
marginalized individual in society. Many members of the communities in this research 
arrived in the city in this same manner and without the ability to work in professional 
jobs; In addition, because they lacked resources, they usually had to invade lands to have 
a place to sleep.  
The locales play an important role as a cultural space in the urban areas in the city 
providing a much-needed recreational outlet in addition to its function as a political 
organization. Indeed, it could be that the marginalization so many of these migrant 
communities feel in their places of work only adds more to their desire to participate in 
the commission and have their political voice heard. (Sevillano, 2016). The commission 
consists of people who have been elected to manage some political and social 
responsibilities in the locales; these positions of authority change on a regular basis.  
In this sense, these locales are entrenched aspects of politics and culture not only 
within the locales, but also extending to the villages. Many of these areas, especially in 
the area of Lima called Villa El Salvador (VES) where this study partly takes place, are 




contestation. This political contestation has in turn created many forms of citizen 
organization. After many invasions and removals of people and their houses over years, 
VES was finally established as a “self-managing” community on the outskirts of Lima 
during the 1970’s under the Velasco government. These and other similar areas were 
populated by families from the rural provinces during these decades, leaving an important 
impact on the development of the city. Regarding these locales, Peattie (1990) states that, 
‘local politics’ and ‘citizen participation’ at the community level are linked to national 
politics, not simply as a reflection of, but also as an agency in that politics” (Peattie, 
1990, p. 29). 
Customary political organization 
Political Organization and Social Structure 
Issues of marginalization, primitive accumulation, and environmental conflict 
make JEM a good candidate for a study on the effects of customary political organization 
(CPO) on the development of the mining industry. In both villages of this study, political 
organization is based in La Directiva-Comunal (The Communal Directive), which 
includes the President, Vice President, Secretary, Treasurer and Speaker (PACCPERU 
2011). The Communal Directive is an autonomous governing body elected by the village 
asambleas to organize the community, manage the land, and interact with the larger 
Peruvian government. This type of organization has governed everything from law and 
order, to land, water, and other natural resources rights. The social structure of Quechua 




These communities include the family, the village or pueblo and their Communal 
Directive or gobierno comunal, the locale or the community of village migrants that live 
in the capital. In addition, there is the communal network or red comunal, which is an 
organization of various Communal Directives over a certain region which interact with 
the larger Peruvian government. Increasingly in modern times, as economies, technology, 
and politics are changing these asambleas are confronting issues of greater and greater 
political impact and significance.  
The family plays an important role in politics in Quechua communities because it 
is the main social unit represented in the village. Each family acts as a different voice in 
the village meetings, called asambleas, to give different perspectives about the issue of 
the day, and each family has its own hierarchical organization.  For example, the elders 
are more important than the young people especially with regards to their political 
perspectives. As an individual ages, their perspective becomes more important in the 
decisions that the village makes together. Usually most families hold family meetings, or 
reuniones, whenever necessary in order to discuss issues that are affecting the family or 
the community. These issues could include education, health, business opportunities, 
familial problems, local political leadership, community corruption, and most important, 
the discussions about layme (land management and distribution). In this sense, the 
families are the social fabric that weaves the villages and their political interests together.  
This social fabric aspect of the family becomes truly evident when a local 
politician fails in one of their duties or is caught in some type of corruption. For example, 




for generations. Even newer generations who were not involved in any corruption will be 
reminded of the corruption of their ancestors throughout their lives, and especially 
forcefully when they begin to assume any important political charges. “Remember that 
your Grandfather lost this piece of land to another village because he loved a woman 
from there, do not follow his footsteps”, is something many young people commonly 
grow up hearing. In this way the actions of past and current family members reflect upon 
the whole family, which functions as a device of social control to make every member 
conscious of their actions.  
 The village consists of a small number of families that live together in one area 
and control the land and water in that territory through varied indigenous forms of 
political organization. The families that live in that area govern the use of land and water 
through asambleas. The asamblea is a democratic meeting where all the families 
participate to govern land and water use, construct roads, manage education, resolve 
territorial problems with other pueblos and many other aspects of village life. The 
asamblea also determines who will run the Communal Directive. 
Communal-based Land Management  
 Land management can imply different types of management and development of 
resources depending on who is in a position of authority regarding these decisions. In 
communal land management people often work together, share land areas, especially 
those used for grazing and foot and water passage, and benefit from the land together. 




making process involving all the members of the community, and this process allows for 
a fairly equal distribution land resources.  Every member of the community helps and 
benefits from this arrangement and it is a very good form of customary land management. 
This lies in stark contrast to the capitalist and neoliberal idea of market competition and 
resource exploitation.  
In order to accomplish this type of mostly equal distribution of resources and 
labor, the Quechua economic system encompasses many concepts. These include  
“mutual assistance” (in Quechua, ayni) “shared land and labor” (minka) and “land use 
and distribution”, (layme). These are common words/practices in Quechua that have been 
maintained for more than 500 years, and they continue to be integral parts of these 
communities. Customary management in the Andes over time can be considered as a 
form of cultural and historical management of local resources, the most important being 
the control, distribution, and administration of the land and its produce. Additionally, 
communal management of the land for the Quechua communities in the Andes is a 
significant and important form of indigenous economic power. Attempts to measure 
“indigenous territory” have been made to see how much land indigenous people need to 
govern in this fashion (Davis & Wali, 1994). These forms of communal land 
management have given rise to new concepts around land titling and land tenure within 





These different forms of common pool resource management would be 
impossible without land tenure, or the ability to own, hold, and pass down property over 
generations. Equally, without the official titling of lands over the past decades, as detailed 
above, it would also be impossible to have any functioning system of land tenure in the 
modern legal sense. As Schwartzman and Zimmerman (2005) stated, “Although 
necessary, tenure security for indigenous peoples is not tantamount to sustainable 
management. Typically, indigenous people need to continue and develop their own socio-
cultural role according their context in order to manage their own resources” (Brandon 
1996 in Schwartzman & Zimmerman 2005, p. 724). For example, the distribution of land 
in Quechua communities, specifically in this research can be considered equitable 
because the socio-political structure of the communities this distribution has always 
maintained certain historical regulations such as, hereditary land tenure, communal dry 
land farming, and demarcated lands for community pasture use. Hereditary land tenure is 
a system of generational land ownership that is usually located close to the town that 
includes houses with their respective yards or small fields. If there are people who do not 
have land or migrate to these communities, they need the permission of the community if 
they want to build a house in the free areas that belong to all of the community.  
Furthermore, all the members of the community know which family owns each plot of 
land that is close to the village.  
In contrast, communal dry land farming is practiced on land far away from the 




elevation of 4000 meters above sea level. Usually every two years they rotate this 
communal dryland, which is known as layme, which means “a new place where you can 
plant” and “farmland of potato by rotation” (Paredes, 2008, p. 39).   
This rotation depends on the decision of the asamblea, or the meeting of the 
population in a form of direct democracy, where by mutual agreement the population 
decides where the next layme will be. First, the members of the community decide which 
members will be in charge of the distribution of the land for each family. This process is 
rigorous especially if it is about new land that the community never used before or in the 
case of land obtained by conflict between other communities; in these cases, it is 
important to equally distribute the land use among the community members. They 
usually separate fields of land of about 30 acres, and they plot an equal sized field for 
each family. Next, each family draws numbers and these numbers correspond to different 
plots in the layme. For the next two years, each family helps to plant and harvest this 
land, while a special group of people known as kamayoq protect this land during the 
growing season from free-grazing animals. This is a form of ever-changing land tenure 
that allows for successful and equitable ownership and management of large areas of land 
(Yates, 2015).  
 Finally, demarcated lands for community pasture are free for all animals to graze. 
For example, the cows, horses, alpacas, etc. of the communities of this study can graze 
freely on any area of this land. Usually the cows can walk in the mountains and every 




Thus, the community organizes a rotation schedule for all of the different 
families’ plots so that not only does everyone have a place to grow food, but they also 
avoid soil erosion in this manner. These examples provide concrete evidence of how 
these communal-based land practices benefit members of the community in labor 
expenditure, equal opportunity, food production, environmental protection, and more.  
Mining in Peru 
According to previous research about the historical accounts of JEM places in 
colonial times, the Spanish exploited many indigenous people in order to extract any 
minerals that they could, mostly gold and silver (Cordova, 2015).  After independence 
from Spain, the people in those places continued living and developing their own 
economic activity largely based on subsistence farming until recent decades.  
Distribution of mining rents  
The economy of Latin America continues to be based on the extraction of natural 
resources, especially minerals, by focusing on the attraction of international investment 
such as the mining industry. Furthermore, countries such as Peru have become highly 
dependent on this type of economy, without generating their own national industry to use 
these raw resources and sell them for a higher price as manufactured products; instead, 
Peru is trapped in a type of modern-day mercantilism. Indeed, the mining industry in Peru 
could drive economic expansion in the nation if it were to use its resources to 




extraction by foreign companies such as Peru Copper Inc. (Canada, China) Xstrata plc 
(UK, Switzerland), Freeport-McMoRan Inc. (USA), and Monterrico Metals (China). This 
situation has a unique relationship with social conflict that is rooted in local 
environmental concern (Loayza & Rigolini, 2016).  
 Mining activity economically benefits the nation through the use of a process 
called canon minero, which essentially taxes the extraction of resources and then 
redistributes that income through government assistance programs based on population. 
The economic benefits are allocated to regions, provinces, and districts based on their 
population rather than wherever the mining activity is actually in operation (Table 2). 
This creates conflicts over the distribution of royalties across the region (Zavalla, 2004; 
Jaskoski, 2014). Corruption and political interests often lead to mismanaging of the funds 
that are received as a part of these royalties. This intensifies social conflicts between 




This is how the corruption of money, mining, and politics is influencing social 
movements that are happening in the Andes of Peru.  
Table 2: Canon Minero by State 1996-Silva, López, Kuramoto p.182) 








Lima 12,397,791 81.64 6,863,363 90.10 
Cañete 594,326 3.91 172,476 2.26 
Huaura 563,554 3.71 182,826 2.40 
Huaral 402,252 2.65 148,358 1.95 
Barranca 382,741 2.52 122,201 1.60 
Huarochiri 311,509 2.05 60,945 0.80 
Oyon 219,990 1.45 17,903 0.24 
Yauyos 218,722 1.44 27,904 0.37 
Cajatambo 51,844 0.34 9,501 0.12 
Canta 42,752 0.28 11,716 0.15 
TOTAL 15,185,481 100.00 7,617,193 100.00 
Calcauso 
Since President Alberto Fujimori opened Peru to an expansion of neoliberal 
international investment many corporations are seeking to enter these regions and gain 
access to extract minerals. By 2008 they had started to explore in the region of this 
study.  By 2010 some companies were using some new strategies of arriving in individual 
communities to initiate dialogue. This type of formal dialogue is well known today, and 
is called a consulta previa, or a previous consultation. This is a vital step in the 
negotiation process that companies are be required to perform with indigenous 
communities before the extraction of natural resources from their land.  
Since 2010 two different mining corporations have been trying to enter the 
community of Calcauso. First, the Peruvian company Consorcio Minero Horizonte S.A. 




100 hectares that were used as well as the creation of a social fund to the amount of $ 
24,723.20 to finance some programs and projects that the community needed. In 2014, 
another mining company arrived in this community after Horizonte failed its 
negotiations. However, negotiation between these two companies during this time has 
finally resulted in a big project called the Corina Project. This project is located in the 
community of Calcauso and focuses on “... an epithermal gold deposit of mainly minerals 
such as gold and silver” (Minera Ares S.A.C, 2017, p.1). This project is now owned by a 
consortium of mining companies including the Peruvian company Minera Ares S.A.C., a 
subsidiary of British-owned Hochschild Mining P.L.C. 
Mollebamba 
In colonial times, Mollebamba attracted foreigners searching for minerals such 
gold and silver (Cordova, 2015). According to local oral history there were many places 
in the district of JEM that were exploited. Today, in Mollebamba there is the project of 
Trapiche. The company in this place is Buenaventura S.A.C., a Peruvian company 
dedicated to exploration, development, construction, and mining operations. Specifically, 
in this project they are mining for copper and molybdenum, as well as other minerals in 
smaller quantities. This project was explored in different stages from 1994 to 1998 and 
finally in 2000 they started the cartographic and geological work necessary for 
environmental impact studies on about 450 hectares. In 2006, based on the results of 
these studies, the company obtained permission to go ahead with mining activity in 2009. 




experience in Mollebamba and contrast it with that of Calcauso; these results are 
explained in detail in Chapter 4. Thus, mining operations in this region of the Andes have 
a long history, predating that of the Spanish arrival, continuing through colonial times, 





Chapter 3: Methods 
My thesis research focused on Quechua indigenous communities of the Peruvian 
Andes and their forms of political organization extending from the villages (pueblos) to 
migrant communities in the capital (locales). The purpose of this research was to 
understand the complex political structure of these different entities and understand how 
they have negotiated with mining operations taking place in these communities. 
Specifically, two communities: Calcauso and Mollebamba were used as a comparative 
case study. Below, I explain the epistemology and methodology on which research is 
based in more detail.  
Epistemology: A Pragmatic Approach to Indigenous Studies 
Approaching my research with a “pragmatic” epistemology helped me to use my 
mixed-methods data collection processes to truly listen to, and attempt to understand, the 
various opinions in the communities that I studied. As the communities that this research 
focused on have been marginalized by society for centuries, it was critical that I respected 
and understood this history so as not to repeat further marginalization with my study. 
Most principally, I chose to study Quechua indigenous communities because I am from 
those communities and I consider it as my responsibility to help and advocate for them, 
especially because their voice is often the faintest in the national debate about mining.  
 Additionally, my experience with the language, culture, and local politics of these 




perspectives of the people in these two villages and permitted me trusted access to the 
most intimate areas of these communities’ politics, sociocultural dynamics, and the direct 
impacts on their family lives. With the mining company affecting my village in such 
diverse ways, I found it necessary to unravel the diverse perspectives about these 
phenomena through a participatory/advocacy approach.   
Consequently, I needed to constantly be aware of the “action agenda for reform” 
that I was pursuing in relation to my research. As John Creswell explained about 
advocacy research, “...inquiry needs to be intertwined with politics and a political 
agenda...research should contain an action agenda for reform that may change the lives of 
the participants, the institutions in which individuals work or live, and the researcher's 
life” (Creswell, 2003, pp. 9-10).  In this sense, protecting the communities in my study 
from unnecessary exploitation by mining corporations, beneficial education for the 
communities, and open conversation about their opinions on these vital issues were my 
primary “action” objectives with this study. Recommendations informed by this research 
to address their situation are presented in the Discussion Chapter of this thesis. 
Approaching my studies from a “pragmatist’s” stance was appropriate. A 
pragmatic approach gives the researcher the ability to utilize a wide array of strategies to 
best suit their particular inquiry. It allows the researcher to focus on the “problem” at 
hand more than the “method” in use; As Creswell explained, “Instead of methods being 
important, the problem is most important, and researchers use all approaches to 
understand the problem” (Creswell, 2003, p. 11). To capture as much information as 




and the pragmatic approach seemed best suited for this mixed-methods methodology. The 
use of both qualitative and quantitative data helps, “...to provide the best understanding of 
a research problem” (Creswell, 2003, p.12). Finally, as stated at the beginning of this 
section, my research includes an advocacy aspect, because of my relationship with these 
communities, making it highly political. As Creswell noted further, pragmatism helps 
apply, “...a theoretical lens that is reflexive of social justice and political aims” (Creswell 
2003, p. 12). In sum, the specificity and complexity of my research question and research 
location coupled with its socio-political and environmental urgency were such that a 
pragmatic grounded-theory approach seemed the most sensible for this particular study.  
Through this research I sought to help indigenous communities, particularly those 
suffering exploitation from mining corporations, to be included in the decision-making 
process of the state and market actors. Indigenous communities’ missing voice is key to 
creating a more socially-just and environmentally-equitable and sustainable form of 
development. I hope this research will identify existing strategies and provide new 
strategies of successful political organization that can help these indigenous communities 
have an equal place at the negotiating table. 
Methodology: A Comparative and Grounded Case Study Format 
This part of my paper explains my specific case-study research methodology and 
some tactics applied in my investigation. According to Helen Newing , “The 
methodology is concerned with what you will actually do… [And] must also include an 




2010, p. 43). There were three important aspects to my methodology: (1) my comparative 
case study format, (2) my use of grounded theory to guide my research, and (3) my 
employment of mixed methods to perform my data collection and analysis.  
This study compared research results from two communities about their members’ 
feelings towards the mining industry, their political organization, and their effect on 
regional environmental politics. Comparing and analyzing data about social and 
environmental changes from these remote villages gave my research better diagnostic 
capability to determine differences and similarities between these communities. As 
Newing explained, “Comparative case study design is concerned with describing 
similarities and differences in different examples and discussing possible interpretations” 
(Newing, 2010, p. 48).  
In addition, I also included in this case study each of these villages’ satellite 
migrant communities that live in the capital, known colloquially as locales. The locales 
are important communities to analyze as well because of the way they can affect their 
villages of origin politically and economically. I know from being a member of these 
communities and speaking with people there, how strong the influence of these locales 
can be on the villages’ political, social, economic, and environmental decisions. 
However, as these areas have not been studied in-depth by researchers, this knowledge is 
difficult to find properly documented anywhere. I found this lack of information to be 
another compelling reason for carrying out a case study of these communities.  As 
Newing noted, “If the project is addressing a new, poorly developed area of research, 




2010, p. 47). Finally, I realized that while both of these villages and their satellite 
communities are very similar e.g. in race, religion, language, and culture, they are in 
different stages concerning the development of the mining industry and their political 
organization may be different. This is why I believed a case study, specifically a 
comparative case study, was an excellent method for my research as it enabled me to 
gather a large amount of information about an area that has largely not been studied. 
Throughout this research I used grounded theory as a guide for my comparative 
case study. A grounded theory approach allows the researcher to gather information 
before creating a hypothesis or thesis, thus permitting a continual development of the 
main ideas and theories that will inform the results of the research. Grounded theory was 
appropriate for this research, because previous data on these areas was lacking and 
because I wanted to have a participatory aspect to my data collection and wait to develop 
my thesis completely until after I had gathered all of the data.   In other words, I 
developed my thesis throughout my study as I collected information and listened to 
community members’ thoughts and then, used the resources, knowledge, and ideas of the 
community members to guide my further data collection, analysis, and theorizing. 
(Creswell, 2007), explained that, “Grounded theory is a qualitative research design in 
which the inquirer generates a general explanation (a theory) of a process, action, or 
interaction shaped by the views of a large number of participants” (Creswell, 2007, p. 
63). Therefore, I was attempting to not only include these communities in a participatory 
research design, but also to modify my narrative of these case studies as the research 




As this case-study followed a grounded theory and mixed methods approach it 
was necessary to develop an organized approach to my data collection and analysis. To 
this end, this research used “concurrent procedure”. (Creswell, 2003) explains about this 
procedure that, “The researcher converges quantitative and qualitative data in order to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the research problem” (Creswell, 2003, p. 16). 
Therefore, I collected qualitative and quantitative data at the same time from all possible 
sources in order to finally integrate and analyze them. This use of concurrent procedure 
correlated very effectively with my use of an advocacy/participatory and pragmatic 
approach, a grounded theory framework, and a mixed methods data collection and 
analysis process.  
A mixed methods approach was indispensable because it allowed me to be more 
flexible about what type of data I could gather, both qualitative and quantitative. As this 
research followed a grounded theory procedure for data collection, I received direction 
from these two communities about my mixed methods data collection and analysis, 
which enabled me to follow their ideas and advice in a much more flexible and formative 
way. Moreover, gathering both qualitative and quantitative data encouraged me to gather 
as much information as possible about these communities, this was important because of 
the lack of previous research done on these areas of Peru. Finally, using quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to analyze the data gave me many complementary ways to view, 
revise and present my analysis. (Newing, 2010) claimed that the term mixed-methods 
refers “...specifically to research that combines quantitative and qualitative social science 




(Newing, 2010, p. 58). In this sense, a mixed methods approach provided an appropriate 
way to study and compare my different case studies, follow my grounded theory, and 
correspondingly gather, analyze, and present my data.  
Methods 
I applied qualitative and quantitative data collection procedures including 
informal conversations, observational research, semi-structured interviews, household 
surveys and review of archival documents. My data analysis combined the use of 
extensive thematic coding of interviews and statistical analysis of household survey data 
to corroborate findings in both categories of data. I conducted a total of 70 interviews and 
186 surveys in the villages and locales that addressed issues pertaining to demographics, 
mining, political organization, and respondents’ opinions on the various changes taking 
place in their communities. 
Participant Selection Process 
Quantitative 
I recruited potential participants for the household surveys using a random sample 
of village households in two villages. To obtain a random sample of houses in each 
village I used Google Maps satellite imagery of each village that I edited with Krita 
(Krita 3.0 2016) so that each household was selected in red and numbered in black 
(Figures 7 and 8). After each household was numbered in each village, I used the 




number of people to be surveyed in the villages.6 Once this number was determined, I 
used a random number generator to create a list of numbers of houses marked for a 
survey (Appendix D).  
Once a household was selected, I visited the household and asked if they would 
like to participate in the survey (customary practice for approaching people in Quechua 
villages). Even with the random list of households to survey, a map, and my personal 
knowledge of the terrain, there were times when I would find no one at home in the 
houses pre-selected for survey. This caused a dilemma. To maintain as much randomness 
as possible, a coin was flipped at each house where this occurred and depending on the 
result, the survey was administered at either the house to its left or right.  
                                                 
6  In each village I attempted to do at least 45 surveys as the total population of both communities was 
approximately 1,600 people and therefore the sample size needed to be at least 91 individuals in total to 
give me a confidence level of at least 95% with a confidence interval of at least +/- 0.1. My goal was to 
conduct more surveys than this if possible, but this was a minimum. In the end, I was able to conduct 142 
surveys in the villages: Calcauso (85) and Mollebamba (57) giving this research an increased confidence 
level to 99% with the same confidence interval of  +/- 0.1 (National Statistics Service Sample Size 














I recruited potential candidates for interviews using the same randomization 
process described for the surveys above. I sought to carry out at least fifteen interviews in 
each community. I hoped to accomplish more interviews if possible, but I wanted to be 
sure to have a random sample of some households to begin with (Appendix C). As part of 
my grounded theory approach, I realized once in the village that it would also be 
beneficial to speak with close family members from these communities, as well as with 
individuals who held positions of authority. From there, I was able to use the participants’ 
knowledge to generate interviews with more individuals that they knew or recommended. 
Utilizing this strategy, I was able to not only complete my randomly-generated 
interviews, but also many others of importance, bringing my total interviews to 58 in the 
two villages and another 12 in the migrant communities for a total of 70. I could not 
accomplish more interviews in the migrant communities because the geographical 
distance between their homes in Lima was often too great for me to visit them in my 
limited research time frame. 
Language Notes 
According to Ronald Czaja and John Blair, “The reliability of data obtained 
through survey research rests, in large part, on the uniform administration of questions 
and their uniform interpretation by respondents” (Czaja & Blair, 2005, p. 63). This was 
one major challenge for me as I needed to administer these questionnaires in both 




accomplish this, I used my own personal knowledge of Quechua as my native language 
and I also consulted with Quechua language experts in Peru. 
Household Survey 
The household surveys were created using Google Forms and were then translated 
into Spanish, and Quechua. These were then printed out into hard copies so they could be 
brought to these communities. To begin each survey, I arrived at the selected homes and 
greeted the people inside, then I would ask for the mother and father of the home. I 
explained to them the purpose of the survey and the consent form and requested their 
participation. Only two households declined to do a survey because they were very busy 
or were not interested. About half of my surveys were conducted in Quechua and the 
other half in Spanish. I recorded all of my surveys with a Miray 8GB GMD-20 audio 
recorder to be sure I did not mistake any of their answers. I administered most surveys 
personally rather than having participants fill them out themselves by reading each 
question, answering questions if there was confusion, and marking the answer for the 
participant. Notably, most of the young people (18-39) were able to complete the surveys 
themselves without assistance while most of the women usually chose to answer the 
survey I had translated into Quechua. As most men speak Spanish regardless of age, they 
chose to have the survey administered in Spanish. 
Once all of the surveys were complete on paper, the data were entered into 
Google Forms for further analysis. In total, there were 85 survey responses in Calcauso, 




gathered through this small-scale survey I have only chosen to highlight here information 
from the SPSS linear regression results that show an F value of at least 1.0 and an R 
squared value of single digit percentages, this should provide more confidence that my 
results did not arise due to a sampling error. I focused my analysis on how people said 
they felt about mining, village politics, migrant participation in village politics, and how 
these ideas correlated with demographics such as age, gender, village of origin, 
indigenous identity, and employment status. 
Household surveys were a very important aspect of my study as they allowed me 
to gather a large amount of data on political, environmental, and social perspectives and 
then code the data using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) to make 
inferences about the data. This allowed me to then cross-reference these results with the 
archival documents I copied and took photos of while in the communities, giving a good 
picture of the political organization and its effects on environmental politics in the region. 
Finally, qualitative data from interviews were coded and employed to cross-reference 
responses. This provided triangulation of the accumulated data.  
Semi-structured interviews 
The majority of interviews, 58, were completed in the villages with 12 interviews 
coming from the locales. All of the interviews were video recorded using a GoPro Hero 
or a Canon EO5 Rebel T3 camera and audio recorded using a Miray 8GB GMD-20 audio 
recorder. No one declined the audio recording, but the video recording made some 




Actually, many of them were happy with the video because they said that future 
generations perhaps will remember them if one day they are able to see the video. Before 
beginning my pre-selected random interviews, I began with interviewing people who 
were close to me geographically and relationally. As a new researcher, this not only 
helped me to develop my interview skills more and test my recording technology, it also 
helped to me gain a general understanding of the current political, economic, and 
sociocultural context in these communities.  
Usually the interviews were conducted at the participant’s home, but some were 
also carried out in their fields while they were working, and even sometimes while we 
were walking in the mountains. In some cases, I adjusted the questions, because the 
respondents did not understand many academic words, especially when they only spoke 
Quechua. One big difference between semi-structured and structured interviews is that 
with semi-structured interviews the researcher has more liberty to change the question 
order, skip or add a question, as well as ensuring a maximum ability to each interviewee 
to speak freely for as long as they wish.  
Newing (2010) suggested the use of an “interview guide” to help with the 
organizational structure of the interviews. Utilizing this interview guide while gauging 
individual context, knowledge, and emotion of my research participants, led me to ask 
some questions of some people that I did not ask of others, I may have even skipped or 
added some questions based on the responses of my interviewees.  I wanted my 
interviewees to be able to talk freely about the specific or general questions. I hoped this 




converse about them. Newing tells us that, “An underlying premise of qualitative 
interviewing is that the less you direct the conversation and the more you gain the trust of 
the interviewee, the more accurate the information that emerges” (Newing2010: 98). I 
believe that my ability to speak with these communities in many different settings, in 
their native language of Quechua, and my knowledge of the culture and politics of these 
communities helped me greatly as an inside researcher in gaining the “trust” of my 
interviewees. As Newing (2010), explains, “semi structured interviews are more targeted 
than unstructured interviews but more flexible than questionnaires” (Newing, 2010, p. 
102). These semi-structured interviews were an invaluable aspect to my research, 
especially once I collected the household surveys and compared the answers.  
Informal Interviews 
In addition to semi-structured interviews, I also conducted various informal 
interviews, which included informal conversations with members of the community. 
More of my free time was spent in the village of Calcauso, because sometimes my father 
needed my help in his fields; these provided good moments for informal interviews. 
Newing states that informal interviews can be very helpful in, “...providing information 
related to the background and context of the study cross-checking information gathered 
by more structured methods” (Newing, 2010, p. 100). These informal interviews were 
very important because people were always busy in these villages and usually they did 
not have time to spend an entire hour with me. Therefore, I took advantage of 




This included speaking with men and women when they were walking to their fields or 
caring for their animals. It also included speaking with women privately when they were 
cooking, or speaking with men privately during their break time from work. Finally, a 
great informal moment to speak with people privately and in small groups was during 
mealtime, these were situations where people feel more comfortable and they were more 
prone to say what they really think or believe without my input or questions. This made 
informal interviews an important aspect of my study.  
Participant Observation 
In addition to my interviews, I also observed as many meetings (asambleas) as 
possible in the communities of this research.  Being an inside researcher, I was also 
permitted to film these assemblies using the recording equipment mentioned above, this 
is not something they have allowed others to do. During these assemblies, I also took 
extensive notes focused on understanding the perspectives, practices, and daily routines 
of the members of these communities while engaged in the political process.  
General Assemblies happen twice a week in each village, but if there is some kind 
of emergency, an Emergency Assembly can be called to resolve the issue. In addition to 
these General Assemblies, each week they have at least two meetings called sesiones. 
This type of meeting includes the elected authorities from the different quadrants of the 
village who join to discuss local matters to decide if they can be resolved there or if they 




Meetings are usually announced using a megaphone at 5:00 A.M. and people 
appear by 6:00 A.M., the meeting usually lasts until 7:00 A.M. After the meeting, 
everyone leaves the village for their own work. Through my observation I wanted to  
illuminate how people express themselves in the asambleas, how they interact as a 
community, and most importantly how they organize themselves for everything from 
land distribution, housing construction, and field maintenance to political action that 
directly affects regional environmental politics. Finally, as this is a comparative case 
study, I hoped to compare the different methods of political organization between the two 
villages that I researched. Not only is observational research a great method for 
comparative case studies, but according to Newing (2010), observational research also, 
“...aims at in-depth description and understanding rather than explanation” and when 
combined with comparative case studies it can, “...draw inferences and generate theories 
about the differences between them” (Newing, 2010, p.46). This benefited my grounded 
theory development process. 
Document Review 
The final aspect of my qualitative data gathering was a review of various official 
documents from these communities including community statutes, mining agreements, 
letters from mining companies, correspondence between migrant communities and 
villagers, and the archival records of the actions of previous village assemblies. In 




above also have officially recorded minutes, which I have documented and have 
attempted to include in my analysis  
Extensive Strategies of Data Collection and Analysis 
My research contains different type of strategies that permitted my investigation 
to gain a broad understanding of the communities studied here.  In this sense, my 
epistemological choice to apply an advocacy/participatory approach and pragmatism 
were beneficial as they provided a framework of direction that was largely decided by the 
very communities that I am advocating for. Furthermore, by using grounded theory to 
improve and add ideas, input, and information from the community members, I was 
trying to ensure that these traditionally marginalized communities did not become more 





Chapter 4: Results 
These data results show the most prominent themes that emerged after 
thematically coding all interviews and using descriptive and correlative statistics on the 
survey data with SPSS and Google Sheets Statistics.  
The most important themes to emerge during this research process centered on the 
economic and social challenges the villages and locales face as a result of increased 
globalization and specifically the arrival of international mining corporations in the area. 
In discussing these themes, I distinguished two principal categories: customary political 
organization (CPO) and negotiations with the mining companies. In order to understand 
the political structure of these communities, it is important to understand the political 
connections with other organizations such as migrant communities for village decision-
making processes, and how they shape power relations in village politics (Table 1).  
Customary Political Organization (CPO) 
The political organization that exists in both the villages and locales is unique. 
Major themes emerging from the interviews in this regard include the assembly structure, 
the process for voting between villages and locales, and the general authority and tasks 
that this political organization is charged with executing within these communities. The 
surveys also revealed some interesting details about political organization in these areas. 
To determine which factors were most important in regard to political organization to 




independent variables: gender, age, village of origin, and if the participant had lived in 
the capital or not against the five dependent variables:   (1) Frequency of participation in 
village assemblies; (2) Ever having had a position of authority in the village; (3) Belief 
that village authorities work for best interest of the community; (4) Belief that political 
organization positively affects negotiations with the mines; and (5) Belief that villagers 
who now live in the locales should participate in village politics.  
Political organization of the villages 
The political organization in the villages of Calcauso and Mollebamba has some 
similarities to the formal organization of the central government, most principally in the 
names and roles of the different positions of authority.  According to one village leader 
from Calcauso:   
The organization of the Board of Directors in the community is similar to the 
institutions of the state that has its President, Vice President, Secretary, 
Treasurer, Prosecutor, etc. Both of the communities have their own written 
statutes that help to organize their political structure and these statutes can be 
modified by the assembly when circumstances change that might demand 
modifications. 
 
Thus, these communities are organized according to written rules, however; these rules 
can be changed as needed. As another leader of the village of Calcauso explained, “For 
example the statute of Calcauso says the term for the President is two years. but in 2008 
the assembly the community decided on just a one year term; because of the mining 
question it is dangerous to allow a President to remain for two years”. This flexibility 




consensus of the community when circumstances changed at the beginning of the 
negotiation with the mining companies. The frequency of assemblies and who the 
authorities are in these assemblies is thus of crucial importance for these communities. 
Frequency and demographics of village assemblies 
In the villages it was reported by interview participants that they hold weekly or 
biweekly sessions where the elected representatives and those in positions of authority 
meet, bring concerns from their wards of the village, and report back the results of the 
sessions. Assemblies for both villages, where all members come and participate, were 
held every month. These assemblies usually lasted for a few hours on average in 
Calcauso and an entire day in Mollebamba.  The surveys indicated that middle-aged 
migrants (30-65) were the primary attendees making up 71.2% of the total monthly 
assemblies while only accounting for approximately 46.7% of the total voting population 
(PACC Peru, 2010), this age group was therefore overrepresented by 52% as warranted 
by population. In addition, less participation in the monthly meetings was witnessed for 
participants between the ages of 18-29 and past the age of 65 at only 28.8%. As this 
population accounted for approximately 53% of the total voting population, it can be said 
that these age groups were underrepresented by 54% as compared with their population 
index.  The second dependent variable test about having had a position of authority in the 
village or not showed that if the participant was male, they were more likely to have had 
a position of authority in the village than if they were female (Figures 17 and 18). 
Furthermore, these results also signified that the older an individual was the more likely 




contributing to whether an individual “ever had a position of authority in the village” 
were gender and age with Pearson Correlation values of 0.325 and -0.205 respectively.  
In this case, I divided the age groups into those between the age of 18-39 (Figure 19), and 
those over the age of 40 (Figure 20), to see the differences between them.  
 
Table 3: Position of authority in the village by Gender and Age 
Demographics Position of Authority - Yes Position of Authority - No 
Males 82.2% 17.8% 
Females 50.7% 49.3% 
Ages 18-39 55.3% 44.7% 
Ages 40+ 72.6% 27.4% 
 
These results are some of the most reliable so far tested according to the F and 
Sig. values reported, they showed a very low likelihood of having been obtained through 
a sampling error. They also seem to be the most significant so far accounting for about 
16.3% of total variance, this means that gender and age account for this percentage of 
possible reasons why someone would have had a position of authority or not. The 
positive and negative correlation values for gender and age will be examined in the 
Discussion chapter of this thesis. 
Assembly decision-making process 
It is important to understand how the community assembly decides what kind of 
instruments of authority can be used in order to make decisions. As one individual from 
Calcauso explained “...the assembly is the maximum authority, there it is decided if we 




the central power of the decision-making process and its implementation allows the 
participation of the community in a form of direct democracy by permitting each 
community member to not only participate in the meetings but vote directly as well. This 
allows them to maintain the interest of the community at heart when solving direct 
problems. The assembly functions very much in the same capacity in both Mollebamba 
and Calcauso.  As a member from the village of Mollebamba said, “The assembly 
resolves and analyses the problems, the leaders utilize the assembly as an instrument and 
like a situation of support”. The assembly helps community members know their opinion 
and voice is heard. The assembly is highly important to solve any problem of the 
community and that encourages greater cohesion in the community. As a member from 
the village of Calcauso said: 
The assembly puts order and discipline. If it were not for the assembly and the 
duties of the community there would be disorder here...this is why we work well, 
the assembly is like a father or mother...there in the assembly we discuss 
everything and we air our dirty laundry, if it were not for the assembly there 
would be tremendous disorganization. 
 
Despite the importance of the process of decision-making and organization in the 
community, it is important to acknowledge some changes that they are facing in modern 
times. Due to the emergence of some critical issues surrounding the mine, authorities 
often need to hold more than two assemblies in the same month. While assemblies still go 
for an entire day in Mollebamba, the assemblies in Calcauso have had to reduce their 
available time for discussion, especially if the agenda is about mining, otherwise it could 
take too much time to reach 100% complete consensus, instead majority consensus is 




having disagreements among themselves as a result of the pressure from these outside 
economic and social forces. One interviewee from Calcauso said,   
“The assemblies don’t want to delay more hours...after two or three opinions they 
want to cut off the discussion...Before, the assemblies didn’t stop the whole damn 
day! Now [they go] for just a few hours, 2 or 3 [people] put in their opinions and 
we’re done, the decision [for mining] is already approved!...In one assembly they 
didn’t let me speak because I kicked out the miners [who are not from the village] 
from the assembly...What the hell are they doing here anyway and what do they 
have to do in our assembly [the engineers of the mining company]!? They have no 
reason to be listening, they should be outside of the community, we have to have 
the debate among ourselves.”  
 
Conflicts such as this were taking place and, as noted above, even with Calcauso holding 
more assemblies than Mollebamba, they still had less time to handle these conflicts 
because the mining companies did not want to see a long process of complete consensus-
making in the villages because that took too much time. It is important to note here that 
depending on the people in charge of the assembly and their viewpoints on mining, some 
people, like the previous interviewee, may have been ostracized or cut off from speaking 
their mind altogether. This was important because she said this almost never happened 
before the mining company arrived in the village, so it seemed some of the rules of 
consensus-making had been changing since the entrance of the mining companies. 
The relative confidence in village of authorities was reflected in the correlational 
relationship among the independent variables mentioned above for the survey question: 
“Belief that village authorities work for the best interest of the community. The results 
showed weak correlations mostly centered on gender and village of origin.7 83.9% of 
                                                 





men and 85.7% of people from Calcauso agree or strongly agree that the authorities of 
their village were working for their best interest. Women’s views were mixed, indicating 
the least trust for authorities among respondents at 68.1% (Table 2).  All of this seemed 
to demonstrate that while the political organization in these villages is a vital and 
important part of everyday life, these organizations are slowly changing due to outside 
pressure, especially from the mining interests. 
 
Table 4: Belief that authorities are working for the best interests of the community 
Demographics Agree/Strongly Agree Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
Male 83.9% 8.9% 
Female 68.1% 17.0% 
Calcauso 85.7% 6.3% 
Mollebamba 74.4% 12.8% 
 
Connection to the migrant locales in Lima 
According to my interviews and survey data each village has one migrant 
community in Lima called a locale, with whom they have had deep political, economic, 
and social connections. These relationships had been under strain since mining 
companies had begun to explore the region in 2004. This is discussed in further detail in 
the following two themes of this chapter; however, here it is important to at least mention 
that Calcauso and Mollebamba maintained different degrees of connections with their 
respective locales. These connections include rules to govern political interactions 




political power that each organization can exert in their own sphere of influence, 
economic support through loans, and traditional cultural events. 
At the most basic level, the link between the villages and the locales is familial 
and this often can be a route for other viewpoints to find their way into the village 
assemblies. As a member from Calcauso stated, “The migrants send us [their opinions], 
or if not, they come [to the village]. This is how we receive them and they explain [their 
opinions] to us. They come to us, because as the migrants say, ‘I cannot forget my 
Mother or my Father’.” This connection is maintained through constant communication, 
economic support, and social events. Another participant from Mollebamba said,  
“With the migrants, of course, we have communication. They have also asked for 
support from what the mine has given us, so we have also given them [loans] to 
buy their land…but before there was a [political and social] relationship. 
However there came a point where we did not like the locale because they did 
their activities with the name of the district and they had some misguided 
Presidents that took away the will of the migrants. They also tried to fill their 
pockets as soon as they made their [social] activities instead of working honestly 
with others. Because of this corruption we have seen, we do not have as much 
communication with migrants now.”  
 
As another interviewee from Mollebamba also agreed that,  
“The relationship is not good; the migrants seem to want to impose their 
perspectives on the community and they only arrive because of the mining 
ignoring important issues to members of the village like land tenure conflicts with 
another community over land in the Puna.”  
 
Even with relations between villages and locales in such a strained condition, the 
vast majority of survey respondents from both Calcauso (82.1 %) and Mollebamba (75 
%) agreed or strongly agreed that migrants that live in the capital should participate in 




respondent was, or if they were from Mollebamba, they were more likely to disagree that 
migrants that live in the capital should participate in village politics.8 Table 3 shows this 
response divided by those over or under 40 years old, and between the villages of 
Calcauso and Mollebamba.  
 
Table 5: Belief that migrants should participate in village politics 
Demographics Agree/Strongly Agree Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
Ages 18-39 69.8% 16.3% 
Ages 40+ 81.2% 5.9% 
Calcauso 82.1% 11.5% 
Mollebamba 75.0% 11.5% 
 
Additional correlation analysis showed that people who have lived in the capital 
had a greater tendency to believe that political organization can positively affect 
negotiations with the mining companies.9 This correlation is illustrated by the fact that 
almost twice the percentage of respondents (61.1%) who had lived in the city agreed or 
strongly agreed that political organization affected mining negotiations compared to 
respondents who had not lived in the city (39.3%). Conversely, 28.6% of respondents 
who had not lived in the city disagreed that political organization affected mining 
negotiations where only 12.9% of city dwellers disagreed. These differences are most 
likely due to different experiences by these two groups regarding the mining negotiations, 
                                                 
8 This survey question showed the strongest correlations for age and village of origin with Pearson 
Correlation values of -0.165 and 0.146 respectively. 
9 Pearson Correlation value of 0.210 showed a weak correlation with the survey question “Belief that 
political organization positively affects negotiations with the mines” and the independent variable “lived in 




interactions with formal political institutions, and the witnessing of corruption within 
their own authorities 
Political organization of the locales 
The Association of Migrants (AoM) acts as the political authority for migrants 
from the villages Mollebamba and Calcauso who live in Lima, as mentioned above, each 
village has their own migrant community in Lima.  It is the equivalent of the assembly in 
the villages. Their association consists of the same positions of authority and quasi-direct 
democracy already described for the villages. These type of associations, created and 
governed by people who migrate to the city, are commonplace and by no means unique to 
the two villages described here, but rather are found for most communities of migrants 
that have come from the provinces outside of Lima. As Enrique Puente, an engineer from 
the Ministry of Mining and Energy, commented during a meeting at his office in Lima, 
“All the communities of the region speak with their migrants [village migrants that live in 
the city], it is not unique to Calcauso.”  These Associations of Migrants serve the role of 
organizing villagers within the city of Lima and also helping to make decisions for their 
respective rural villages.  
Each village creates their own AoM when they arrive in the city, even if they are 
less than a dozen people. Among various AoMs from the same district, such as Juan 
Espinoza Medrano, each association will elect a President to go and speak with other 
Presidents from the other AoMs creating an Association of the District of Juan Espinoza 




between villagers and migrants from one village, the AoD functions as an intermediary 
between all the district migrants in Lima collectively by interacting on a regular basis 
with the Mayor of the District of Juan Espinoza Medrano. Thus, each village maintains 
direct political connections with their respective AoMs, these AoMs form themselves in 
an AoD and this allows them to maintain a direct political connection with the larger 
District of Juan Espinoza Medrano as a whole (Figure 9).  
 
Figure 8: Political Relationships between Villager, Locales, and District/Village 
Authorities 
For example, during this research the migrants of Calcauso had an assembly to 
organize a caravan of representatives to attend the official meeting about the mining 
decision in the village. As the president of the assembly said during this important 
organizing meeting,  
“The agenda today is about the mine, we need to send a commission that will 
participate in the community, so one member from each family needs to travel or 





The community of Calcauso used to be just an annex of the district of Juan Espinoza 
Medrano, but in recent decades its status changed and it became a centro poblado 
(incorporated town) with its own mayor and local administration. This benefitted both the 
district Juan Espinoza Medrano and the village. Another participant said, “The creation 
of the centro poblado was with the decisive intervention of the migrants...it was the 
decisive part of the organization of migrants in Lima that intervened for the community 
[in this regard]”. An influential member of Calcauso explained the function and 
relationship with the President of the community as a mayor of the incorporated 
township. 
We have different functions. The mayor just governs the urban center and must 
respect the rights of protection [of the community] or help develop the urban 
center and manage projects and meet with the other district and provincial 
mayors. [This] while the President of the community represents the whole 
territory, so there can be conflicting problems between communities and the 
President would be called [for example]. 
 
In the community of Mollebamba the Presidential election is quite different from 
Calcauso because the migrants in the locale do not participate actively in voting for the 
President of the community, just in the mining negotiations or any other problem where 
the community needs to have coordination with the migrant communities.  According to 
the former President of the community of Mollebamba:  
We have two types of members of the community: the active community member, 
and inactive community member. The active community member is one that lives 
in the village and participates in the labor, assemblies, and whose vote is 
officially registered. An inactive community member is someone from the village 
that mostly does not live in the village and does not participate in the assemblies 
or work. In this case, an inactive community member can give their opinion in the 
assembly when they are here in the village, but their vote doesn't count, they can 





Frequency and demographics of village assemblies 
During my in-depth interviews in the locales, I asked a series of questions about 
locale political organization and the results indicated that locale politics is highly 
influenced by the variables of age, gender, and village of origin and the generation gap is 
pronounced.  Different generations have varying perspectives regarding mining, whether 
migrants living in the capital of Lima should play an active role in village politics, and 
carry authority inside of the village. Aside from the interview data, the survey questions 
yielded important results about individuals participating in these organizations. These 
included: (1) whether they had had a position of authority inside of the locale, (2) how 
often they participated in the meetings of the locale, (3) whether they believed that the 
authorities were working for the benefit of the village, (4) whether they believed that land 
titling was beneficial for the village, (5) whether they participated in the village 
assemblies or not, and (6) whether they believed that village migrants should have had 
more rights in the decision-making process for the villages than the migrants of the 
locales. 
The results for the first dependent variable of the surveys indicated that the 
younger the respondent, the less likely they were to have had a position of authority in 
the locale.10 When the results were divided by people over and under 40 years old it 
became clear that 100% of respondents over 40 years old had held a position of authority 
                                                 
10 The dependent variable have you ever had a position of authority in the political organization of the 




in the assembly, while only 23.1% of respondents under the age of 40 have ever had a 
position of authority in the assembly (Figure 50). Likewise, 68.2% of people who 
responded to my survey participated regularly in the locale.  However, the younger a 
person was, the less likely they were to participate in the locale assemblies (n= 44; r = 
.545).11 Only 72.7 % of respondents (n= 44) who were less than 40 years old indicated 
they participated in the locale in Lima, while 93.8% of respondents over 40 said they 
participated. These observations are important in order to elaborate on the generation gap 
later in the Discussion chapter of this thesis. 
Assembly decision-making process 
Much like its political organization, the assembly decision-making process is very 
similar to that of the villages. As compared with Mollebamba where only active village 
members can vote, the fact that the community of Calcauso used to have a strong 
relationship with the migrants is evident in the active participation in the decision-making 
process of the migrants; they are allowed to vote in elections regardless of being an active 
village member or not. One participant from Calcauso said, "Always migrants from 
different cities  vote for the President [of the village], in Arequipa, Lima, Abancay, Ica, 
etc.”   
In the community of Calcauso the participation for the election of the President of 
the community was always through direct vote. The migrants had the ability to participate 
                                                 
11 For the second dependent variable how often do you participate in meetings or gatherings of migrants in 





in votes in order to elect the President, but this right was not legally documented.   It was 
an informal rule that was agreed upon by the assembly. Due to the arrival of the mining 
companies, land titling, and formal regulation, by 2016, this type of informal agreement 
could not continue anymore in the community of Calcauso. A different individual from 
migrant community (Lima) explained:  
All of this regulation has come since the mining companies arrived in the region.  
Before we always voted for the President of Calcauso from Lima and we would 
send an official to say who the winner in Lima was so they can add in the total 
amount of votes for the President of the village. [We are] always in 
communication [with the village] and this has always been the case since we have 
had our organization in Lima, but now it is totally changed. The communities 
need to be very formal and in Abancay the review of the signatures of the 
volunteers is more regulated… However, as migrants we make mistake too 
because we could have registered everyone so we would not have had this 
problem 
 
The formal regulation of the vote affected the relationship between migrants and 
villagers. As a result, migrants who live in Lima cannot vote for the President, if they are 
not registered as a member of the community.  
 As an example, the same previous interviewee explained about the votes of the 
migrants of the locale from Lima and Ica: 
Today votes of the migrants do not count in the Presidential votes in the 
community in Calcauso, because when they want to confirm their candidate and 
validate the vote of the migrant, there is no account because of the lack of 
formalization and registration. 
 
He continued:  
Before we always considered the migrants [in Presidential votes] the problem 
was to present and put their names in public registers so they can count the 
signatures there. In Lima there is a total of 200 signatures that are not in the 





One individual from locales explained that it was the lack of coordination and work in 
locales, where migrants needed to register their names with the address of their home 
village, even if they lived in Lima most of the year. This was in order to have the 
signature recognized, so there were a lot of signatures from Lima and many of them were 
not recognized as members of the community on paper. In other words, their vote was not 
valid until they had registered because they did not have the address to participate in any 
kind of votes in the villages. One interviewee from Calcauso talked about his own 
personal situation:  
I have an address in Calcauso and I can go to vote there when I want. Even 
though I have lived in Lima more 20 years I changed my voting address to 
Calcauso [so I can vote in elections] for President or Mayor, etc., so my vote for 
the president of Calcauso is valid! 
 
The third question focused on whether respondents said they felt that village 
authorities work for the benefit of the village.  In the analysis, the most important 
independent variable with a Pearson Correlation value of 0.578 was village of origin. 
Migrants from the village of Mollebamba were more dissatisfied with their village 
authorities than those of Calcauso (Figures 50 and 51). In fact, not one person agreed 
with this statement from Mollebamba and 70% either disagreed or strongly disagreed, 
whereas in Calcauso those who agreed and disagreed were equal, with the other 46.7% 
remaining neutral. This may have been due to the communities’ recent experience of 
negotiating with the mining companies, a process in which Mollebamba is farther along 
than Calcauso, as will be elaborated on in the following section about Negotiation with 




The results of the fourth question,   whether respondents believed that land titling 
is beneficial for the community showed that the most important independent variables 
were village of origin and age.12 There was a slightly positive correlation for both of 
these variables, indicating that the older a respondent was, or if the respondent was from 
Mollebamba, they were more likely to disagree that land titling is beneficial for the 
community (Table 5). This is an interesting result considering the fact that Mollebamba 
had just gone through the land titling process with the State, this will be explored further 
below.  
 
Table 6: Belief that land titling is beneficial for the community 
Demographics Agree/Strongly Agree Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
18-39 43.8% 43.8% 
40+ 14.3% 42.9% 
Calcauso 40.0% 33.4% 
Mollebamba 25.0% 62.5% 
 
Connection to the villages in JEM 
The relationship between migrants of the locales and the villagers of the village 
are political, cultural and economic.  A very influential member of the governing 
authority in Mollebamba, explained how his locale and village of origin are connected in 
these diverse ways: 
The social center of Mollebamba was opened up economically many times to 
solve these problems of boundaries, especially when we had problems with 
Matara [territorial conflict] ... in all these processes the populated center [of 
                                                 




Mollebamba] was present, this is information that it is not written, that it is not 
stored anywhere, to [help] break down [these issues]. 
 
In this way a territorial conflict actually helped the village of Mollebamba develop better 
relations with their migrant community, especially after having it strained so much during 
their mining negotiation process. In another example from the same interview the 
participant continued to explain how Mollebamba helped their locale by offering them a 
large sum of money to purchase land in the capital and how this gesture has engendered 
more trust and cooperation between these entities. 
...the community [Mollebamba] supported us with 100,000 thousand soles [for the 
purchase of the land in Lima] we are infinitely grateful and hope that they 
continue supporting us because they also have to be aware that here in Lima are 
all our brothers who were born there and surely they will continue to come 
tomorrow [to Lima] so we need to be strengthened more in infrastructure and in 
organization to meet the needs of both [migrant organizations and villages].  
 
The results of the fifth dependent variable about the participation by locale 
migrants in village assemblies showed that age was the most important independent 
variable. Similar to number two above, this result showed a slight negative correlation for 
age, with younger people less likely to participate in village assemblies.13 Men 
participated in the assemblies of the locales more than women (Figure 56 and 57), while 
younger people (18-39) participated the least (Figures 58 and 59). 
 
Table 7: Participation by migrants in village assemblies 
Demographics Yes No Sometimes 
18-39 50.0% 19.2% 30.8% 
40+ 94.1% 5.9% 0.0% 
                                                 




Demographics Yes No Sometimes 
Males 80.0% 8.0% 12.0% 
Females 43.8% 25.0% 31.3% 
 
This same trend seems to extend as well to whether or not these migrants have held a 
position of authority or not.  
Finally, to determine how migrants viewed voting rights in the assemblies, 
participants were asked if they believed that villagers should have more rights in the 
decision-making process in the village assemblies. The results showed that gender and 
age were the most important factors to determine this perspective. These results show a 
strong correlation that by being female, or younger, the respondent is more likely to 
support this perspective than other migrants.14 People under 40 (64.7%), women (81.1%), 
and migrants from Calcauso (66.74%) were the most likely to agree or strongly agree that 
villagers should have more rights than migrants living in the locales concerning decisions 
in the local political process of the village as seen in Table 6. 
 
Table 8: Villagers should have more authority than migrants 
Demographics Agree/Strongly Agree Disagree/Strongly Disagree 
Ages 18-39 64.7% 17.7% 
Female 81.8% 9.1% 
Migrant from Calcauso 66.7% 20.0% 
                                                 
14 With Pearson correlation values of -0.578 and 0.5 and an F value over 2.0 is the opinion of locale 






Many migrants of the villages and locales expressed both concern about and 
approval of the mining operations, and the negotiations that have taken place in these 
communities over mining have been contentious at times. The populations’ opinions 
varied by demographics of age, gender, and village of origin. However; overall people 
from both villages were more in favor of mining than against it.  
Village Perspectives on Mining 
The surveys (n=142) showed that a large majority of the people in the villages are 
in favor of mining, however they expressed some concerns about environmental and 
social impacts of mining, and these seemed to differ based on the various demographic 
factors mentioned above. For example, a higher percentage of survey respondents from 
Mollebamba than those from Calcauso indicated support for mining near their 
community. Of the 48 people who responded to both these questions in Mollebamba,50% 
(n=24) were in favor of mining while only 23.0% (n=11) either disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with the statement that “mining is a good opportunity for the community” and 
the rest of the respondents were neutral 27% (n=13). Calcauso had only 31.2% (n=25) 
people in favor of mining while 28.7% (n=23) opposed it.  Another 40% (n=33) of the 












Calcauso 31.2% 28.7% 40.0% 
Mollebamba 50.0% 23.0% 27.1% 
 
In addition, multi-variance tests of the independent variables gender, age, village 
of origin, and whether the participant had lived in the capital or not against the 
dependent variable of if the participant believes that mining is a “good opportunity for 
the village” revealed that being a woman and/or coming from Calcauso both had a weak 
correlation to being against the mine.15  
Approval of Mining Operations 
Not all villagers, nor Lima migrants, are in agreement however about the negative 
effects of the mining operations. When both communities were analyzed, more villagers  
(39.4%) seemed to be in favor of the mining operations than against them (25.8%), while 
another (34.3%) remained neutral. Those that are predominantly in favor of the mining 
operations cite their reasons for this position as including economic mobility, 
development, accessibility, and a better education for their children. 
  One participant from the community of Mollebamba said: 
And so, since the year 2000, [the mine] arrived here and pleaded for us to be a 
part of the company: Buenaventura Mining, but it was too easy to convince us. Of 
course, it works well for the youth because of the jobs... [So] they accepted for the 
jobs and not for anything else 
 
                                                 
15 At Pearson Correlation values of 0.153 and -0.151 respectively, the respondent’s gender and village of 




Clearly the main pressure in Mollebamba to accept the mine was about economic 
mobility and access to labor opportunities. In fact, most members of the community of 
Mollebamba, stated that they approved of the arrival of the mining industry due to the 
jobs that it will generate and the potential economic improvement of the village. These 
issues seemed to outweigh the other concerns that people had about community and 
environment.  
In Calcauso, an argument in favor of the mine was that at the time of my 
interviews mining had not begun yet. The company representatives said that they were 
just doing exploration and prospecting to understand how much, and how many types of, 
minerals there were in Calcauso. As one Calcauso villager explained while defending the 
decision of the assembly to accept this first stage of the mine:  
Unfortunately, we are subscribed to this because there is no work. Thinking in the 
village, and many people from Calcauso are students in different cities, there is 
no work and for this reason we want to accept the Ares company [the mine]... For 
me there is no negative [effects of this first agreement with the mining company], 
we just want to know if there are minerals or not. If there are, the mining 
company will knock on our door and if we can coordinate with the migrants there, 
then we can talk about prices. In this moment we are trying to cut off the mine and 
we don’t even know [if there are minerals or not], so we want to know. 
 
Most of the people in Calcauso refer to this same theme, they want to know if there are 
minerals or not. So many are in favor of the mining company at least entering the phase 
of exploration to find out more information about the minerals and their potential value.  
This has created some conflicts with the migrants of the locale in Lima, as one 
Lima migrant said, “Obviously there are minerals because otherwise they would not be 




the internet”. Indeed, according to the article Rumbo Minero (2016), the investment the 
interviewee mentioned was on the internet and referred to the “Projecto Corina”, which is 
the Ares Mining company’s investment of  $4,150,000 in the Calcauso region including 
$2 million specifically for exploration. As such, one respondent from Lima said:  
There are advantages and disadvantages with the mine. There is development for 
the people and there is work for our people. But now as well, we should look at 
the environment. Also, worse corruption could present itself and it would make 
the [community] organization worse. In all, I am in favor for parts of the first 
phase to see if we have minerals or not.  
 
And as another participant added to this that:  
[As far as the mine is concerned], for my part we are already old, so we want the 
entrance of the mine… our age is approaching us, and the resources will remain 
for future generations but we don’t deserve anything? Well, we got together [the 
elders] and we decided that the mine should enter. Maybe there will be 
production or maybe not, but we want to know. 
 
One of the main disagreements between villagers and migrants was that villagers 
wanted to at least do exploration and see how much mining potential there was, while 
migrants in Lima believed that company would not be approaching the village, if they 
were not already sure there were minerals to be had, and wanted to agree on payment 
from the mining company first. These types of disagreements have created some strain on 
the village and locale relations as one woman mentioned, “...before there was more 
agreement between the members of the population on decision-making... now we are not 
in agreement.” These disagreements can lead to strategic manipulations by the mining 




Concerns about mining operations 
Those in the villages that were against mining expressed concerns about the 
environment, the local moral economy, uneven economic development, the weakening of 
family and community socio political ties, and cultural losses. Locale migrant explained 
her fear for the environment:   
For me the mining operation is negative because in the first place I don’t know in 
what condition it will be in because I see on television in other places and regions 
that many suffer. I have seen on television, of course not in my real life, how the 
animals suffer with this contaminated water, animals die, plants, even oneself, 
even the air becomes difficult. So, the community doesn’t think about this and I 
am against that. 
 
This respondent continued, expressing her concern as a migrant in Lima for her home 
village and indicating the deepening political divide between village and locale,  “For 
this reason we, the migrants [of Lima], are opposed to the mine because we see the effect 
of the mine everywhere. The community of Calcauso sometimes does not use its reason, 
they don’t think because they want money”. Another interviewee, this time a woman from 
Calcauso echoed these concerns about the loss of the moral economy,  
I don’t want the mine to come, it will be worse for our animals, our fields, our 
children...if the mine comes the people will just want money and the new 
generation will suffer… The authorities are fighting in the assemblies, some say 
that there should be a mine and others say no, but [the migrants] from Lima they 
don’t want the mine here. If it were not for Lima there would already be a 
mine...here [Calcauso] they just accept and don’t think about the future. Because 
of the money, everyone just wants rice and noodles with this program that brings 
food [government program], they don’t eat natural food anymore and have turned 
into lazy people.  
 





As far as the economy is concerned it’s possible it will get better, but also not 
really if they are going to submit to exploitation, then there will be a tremendous 
amount of corruption in the community. 
 
Another common concern was that mining would not benefit the elderly and 
women in general as much as other groups in the community. As one woman from 
Mollebamba said,  
The elderly people are complaining and the authorities don’t say anything and the 
young people are accepting [the mine]. The elderly people and the women do not 
agree with [the mine] because with the mine unknown people will arrive in the 
village, thefts, pollution so how is [the mine] going to benefit us? They will not 
even give us a job. 
 
This same concern was echoed by another woman, “With the mine, we women do not 
benefit because what job are they going to give us?” Several women interviewed were 
concerned about having enough money for their children’s education. Though many of 
these women were against the mine in principle, because of these types of economic 
necessities, they often still said they would want to work in the mine if they could. This 
was challenging for them, because the company asked for special work permits and 
certifications that these women from the village did not have in order to get most jobs 
that they could qualify for with the mine. The jobs for women in the mine are limited and 
normally do not extend beyond on cooking and cleaning, however ever for this there are 
special permits. The restrictions, lacking licenses and permits necessary to work in the 
mine all make this a painful of experience for these women. Not only are they excluded 
from the labor force of an industry they didn’t really want in the first place, they are also 






Sometimes necessity forces you right? My children are studying and I need 
money, but now they ask for certificates to work so they don’t want to accept you. 
For example, I wanted to help in the kitchen, but I don’t have a certificate so they 
didn’t give me the job. They told me, ‘You have to have a certificate’...this can 
demoralize you sometimes. We are peasants and we don’t have these papers. So 
now another cook from another location will come and it doesn’t make sense.  
 
Some of the concerns about mining operations in the community of Calcauso also 
bring with them hopes for something better. Many people I interviewed contrasted the 
potential for positive economic and technological development with the possible negative 
environmental impacts to the lands of the community.  As one interviewee said,  
There are two points that make us think: on the one side many people say that 
mining companies bring development and the other side says they bring 
corruption and will leave our region completely dismantled, polluted and [it will 
be] a tremendous disaster 
 
The charts below show the responses from the villages of Calcauso and 
Mollebamba on a question concerning the perceived effects of the mining operations 
(Figures 25 and 26). These figures show that respondents from both villages agreed on 
two points: mining will bring more contamination of the environment and cause social 
divisions. 92.94% of Calcauso respondents and 89.47% of Mollebamba respondents said 
they believed that mining will bring contamination to the village while 77.65% and 
48.95% of Calcauso and Mollebamba respondents respectively said they believed that 





Figure 9 - Calcauso: What will be the effects of mining? 
 




Locale Perspective on Mining  
 The survey respondents (n=44) from the locales were almost evenly divided 
between agreement (35.5%) and disagreement (38.7%) with the mining operations, with 
the rest of the respondents (25.8%) remaining neutral. This is a big difference when 
compared with the villages where most respondents agreed that mining operations 
presented a good opportunity for the villages.  
Divided Approval of Mining Operations 
The following table demonstrates some of the conflicted views of locale migrants 
about the issue of mining. Only 17.6% of young people 18-29, 21.4% of women, and 
34.8% of migrants from the village of Calcauso agreed with the statement that mining is a 
good opportunity for the village. This, while 50% people aged 30-39, 50% of men, and 
37.5% of migrants from the village of Mollebamba agreed with the same statement. The 
biggest differences then between demographics in the locales was between young people 
and the middle aged generation and between men and women. 






Calcauso 34.8% 43.5% 21.7% 
Mollebamba 37.5% 25.0% 37.5% 
Male 50.0% 37.6% 12.5% 
Female 21.4% 42.9% 35.7% 
Ages 18-29 17.6% 47.1% 35.3% 
Ages 30-39 50.0% 16.7% 33.3% 
   
Curiously, in addition to these results, 36.8% of young people 18-29, while 




return to their villages to work for a mining company if a decent job presented itself. The 
older generations 30-65 seemed more apprehensive about returning with 66.7% of 
respondents answering “Maybe” and only 14.3% of respondents answering in the 
affirmative. These divisions in the community over the mine became more apparent 
during the negotiation process with the mining company in Mollebamba and Calcauso. 
Concerns about Mining operations 
Interestingly, 50% of migrants from Mollebamba, where mining activity is 
already taking place, agreed or strongly agreed that mining would be negative for the 
environment compared to 70.8% of migrants from Calcauso. 






Calcauso 70.8% 29.1% 0.0% 
Mollebamba 50.0% 37.5% 12.5% 
 
71.4% of women and 73.9% of migrants from Calcauso reported that they agreed 
or strongly agreed that mining is causing divisions in the community, while only 56.3% 
of men and 37.5% migrants of Mollebamba felt the same way.  






Calcauso 73.9% 17.3% 8.7% 
Mollebamba 37.5% 37.5% 25.0% 
Male 56.3% 37.5% 6.3% 






Manipulation by the mining companies 
The tactics and strategies the companies used in the negotiation process caused 
strong discomfort for people who were not allied with the mining operations, and this 
caused some community divisions. People from the village noticed the strategies of the 
mining companies, but because they saw the need for the mining jobs they did not openly 
criticize the companies as they normally would have. The tactics used by the mining 
companies included bribery, corruption, and enticements. It was very common for mining 
companies to sponsor large parties and festivities in villages throughout the region. As 
one woman from Mollebamba explained, "For the festivities [the] mining [company] was 
more pompous with their party, they had many beers [to offer] as if they are 
economically supporting the community.” There were also times where the engineers 
from the mining company came to the village and they invited people who were there to 
have food and drink with them. Customarily, when someone invites others in this way, no 
one can refuse, especially if they need the food. Many of these poor communities were 
not able to offer something as small as a soda or snacks to their visitors, and if somebody 
gave them such things, especially in a large public display, it made that person or 
organization look good.  The villagers who received these gifts felt that they were 
obligated to provide a gift in return. As one man from Calcauso explained:  
The mining companies always weaken the village so they enter first, as you see 
when someone arrives they always have on their side soda and they give jobs, all 
of this is an influence that weakens the village. We all need to work, but do we 





As the woman cited above said about the first phase negotiation:  
We were only 12 people against the mine, the whole world was [in favor] of 
relations [with the mine]. [Social workers] were going by night teaching people 
to sign this because, ‘We are going to give this and that, you will have money and 
work’ the people were saying. These [social workers] are prepared to cheat the 
ignorant people who do not know how to read and don’t even know their rights. 
So, they cheated them like this: in the first little group they organized to sign it 
was all women from the upper neighborhood, they convinced them and they made 
a line to receive [gifts]...After they began to sign [the contract] they gave them 




Not only were food and drink used to bribe people of limited economic resources, 
but possibilities of employment were held out. This respondent questioned though, 
whether this would all be worth the potential mining contract and subsequent disruption 
of the community and environment it might cause in the future. 
Additionally, in the assemblies it was becoming more complicated to talk about 
mining issues because people would identify who was in favor of mining and who was 
not. Unfortunately, in these villages if someone was against mining, it did not look good. 
As a villager from Calcauso said in the assembly “The mining company says that ‘We 
know who are with the mine, each one has been counted up’. What is this? This is a 
threat to frighten the people.” This seemed common in the community of Calcauso, while 
in the community of Mollebamba people spoke more openly about mining in the 
assemblies because they understand better now the pros and cons through their own 
experience working with the mining company, and they therefore accepted other 




to gain access, people said they felt shy to talk in the assemblies against the mining 
operations, especially if they did not have support. As one woman interviewed said “[As 
for] the mining company being in the assemblies...The truth, I realized, is that because of 
fear, nobody will say anything.” Furthermore, people did not seem convinced by some of 
the claims of the mining company that promised they would do restoration work and they 
would return the land to its natural state. Respondents said they felt that the company 
tried to convince people with these arguments, but there were many people who believed 
this was cheap talk. As one interviewee noted:  
It is 100% [guaranteed] that it will not be exactly the same. Sure, they will try to 
do some planting, for example Buenaventura is planting some hay...how many 
times have they planted and taken it out [early] because of no return? Apparently 
they planted in a field which they had disturbed from its original soil...they plant 
with hay, but it doesn’t take, not even if you till 1000 times. This first place made 
us think that they will leave our territory a total disaster. 
 
Acceptance of the Mine in Mollebamba 
In the village of Mollebamba the change of traditional sociocultural values were 
noted by many interview participants. People have become more individualistic focusing 
on their own benefit more than that of the whole village and this is causing people to 
forget about their traditional concern for the environment. As one woman interviewed 
said:  
The mine has cheated the people a lot, the community is very petty now, it has 
divided the people, all of this money...our nature, our mountains, will be left as a 
bare desert, there will not be animals like we have now. Where will the new 
generation go? 
 
Despite these concerns from the opposition voices in the village of Mollebamba 




the time of the negotiation, and the first phase was accepted by the assembly in a vote. In 
recent years, after the first phase of the mining process, people have become more aware 
of the situation and they have a higher level of understanding of the negative effects 
mining may cause to village society and the environment. 
Mollebamba halts mining exploration: Conflict in Parajinos 
As it turned out, in the community of Mollebamba the mining was stopped after 
approximately seven years because of a conflict called Parajinos. This conflict started 
when the community noticed that some members of the community who had land 
(estancias)  that the community allowed them to utilize for pasturing their animals 
received money from the mine. In that area of the village, families had rented these 
village lands intended for grazing to the mine.  Furthermore, the mining company bought 
all the animals that were occupying these lands for a very high rate, and they paid each 
family that had animals in this place on behalf of the community. Other community 
members noticed when those people who lived in the area suddenly improved their 
economic status.  By singling out a few families on communal land, the mining company 
representatives were not acting in good faith to negotiate with the village as a whole.  
Members of the community noticed and opposed this lack of moral professionalism.  As 
one person interviewed said:  
One group of community members [about 40] and about three to five individuals 
[from the mine], created this situation to benefit themselves and forget the rest [of 
us]. There the problem was born, where specifically in our agreement with the 
company, they had to do planning, organization and relocation and they did not 
fulfill this. For those same villagers who have benefited from de-ranging 
[moving] their animals to other far locations [and leasing their lands to the 




more division and conflict. That paradoxical problem against the rest of the 
community is where the conflict with the company is born. The community now is 
at the dialogue table and we are in favor of a harmonious solution, I think there is 
more confidence nowadays.” 
 
In this sense, the conflict of parajinos was the main problem that created division 
in the village of Mollebamba, indeed the mining company’s representatives were still 
trying to negotiate with the community during the time of this research. Unfortunately, it 
was proving to be very complicated to fix the problem that was created by the mining 
industry in this area, however it was serving as a wonderful test of the resilience of local 
political organization in these villages. As one woman said: 
More than anything we want to know how much they [the mine] have given the 
parajinos and they don’t want to tell us how much they gave...Now we have been 
coming to dialogue for more than four years...There will be a meeting on the first 
Sunday of August to see if they want to continue, we are asking for a high sum, if 
not they can close [the operation] to open an artisanal mine, but I don’t know 
how we are going to achieve this, our President is a little bit weak.” 
 
Strained relations between locales and villages 
Participation of the migrant community (locales) for both villages during the 
negotiation with the mining companies was strained due to a lack of consensus-building 
between the villager assemblies and the migrant assemblies. However, even through this 
difficulty, the migrants and villagers maintained their political structure and deep 
connections. This can be seen in the constant communication between the two bodies and 
the sending of delegations from the locales to vote and participate actively in key 
assemblies. The Lima migrants also supported the villages in many ways through their 
professions for those who worked in the area or in the city or through the access to 




The disagreements between the locales and villages increased when the migrant 
community in Lima sent a document to the Congress complaining to the Engineer from 
the Ministry of Mining and Energy and explaining about the disagreements over the 
mining process in the village. This action caused much consternation within the village, 
which was precisely in the middle of its negotiations. A woman close to the negotiations 
detailed:   
The migrants sent two documents to Congress and the Ministry of Mining and 
Energy without consulting the main political body in Calcauso, and why did they 
do this? “We love Calcauso” so they say, but this is not the case. If they [the 
migrants] sent these documents because they love their village, first they should 
have consulted the main political body and if we accept, they can do it. 
Unfortunately, they just did it as they pleased. So, Calcauso told them they must 
come and apologize so that this does not happen again. Our children that come in 
the future could do the same if we don’t give a penalty. 
 
As explained above, this type of sentiment was common among many of the villagers. 
Finally, even though there was a lack of communication at times between the 
villages and the locales, Lima migrants felt as if it were their duty to participate in the 
local politics and decision-making process of the village and the villagers welcomed their 
help, they just did not want it to be for selfish reasons.  As one man said:  
We want the support of our migrant brothers and that they support us not only 
when the [mining] company comes, but also we need economic support to search 
for engineers to make use of the territory. The new generation does not know that 
we border with other [Communities] and what we want from the migrant brothers 
is to know our [territorial] boundaries.  
 
The territorial problem between different communities was one of the other most 
important issues for the community of Calcauso at the time of this research and they 




It is important to acknowledge that in the first negotiation with the mining 
company, in the community of Mollebamba, the villagers had a strong disagreement with 
the migrant migrants in Lima. This disagreement eventually led to the village accepting 
an agreement with the mining company that they later regretted. Years later they would 
ask the migrants for their expertise in forming a new agreement with more favorable 
terms. When asked about this conflict between villagers and migrants, one interviewee 
explained in detail,  
We made an agreement in 2011 and it was in favor of the company, also here 
[there was a] mistrust on the part [of Mollebamba] [towards] the migrants of 
Lima, [the community of Mollebamba] did not allow their participation in the 
agreement that we were going to make and now we have permitted it only recently 
in 2014. For that reason, the communal directive was changed in that we have 
requested migrants of Lima, as we have professionals in each town, and as we 
have already recognized our error, that we need our professionals to guide us. 
[The migrants] came and read the 2011 agreement where they observed 
everything was in favor of the company, we the authorities recognize [the error]. 
Sometimes in the assembly the majority rules ... so [in this moment] the young 
people [wanted] opportunity to work and they voted in favor of the opening of the 
mining company, so they settled on Milloccucho [the new mine].  
 
This situation occurred because of an initial disagreement between villagers and migrants 
and this was the same thing that was happening in the community of Calcauso during the 
time of this research. In Calcauso the villagers had a disagreement with the migrants in 
Lima because the migrants had been trying to stop the mining company from accessing 
village lands or to at least negotiate better terms. This disagreement led to some decisions 
that were taken by the village assembly regarding the mine where the villagers and 




Despite these initial differences in Mollebamba, the negotiation seemed to have 
improved during the time of this research, because the village\ requested the professional 
participation of the migrants to help the community have a better negotiating position 
with the mining company.. As one community leader said:  
So, from the moment they have observed through the professionals from Lima the 
[migrants] have positioned themselves very differently. It did not suit the company 
to have that work paralyzed. For four years now we have been in full dialogue, 
and now at least with professional advice. I hope we can reach an agreement 
because we are not so convinced of what we proposed [before] because of all the 
consequences that can be left to the community as regards environmental impact. 
 
In the case of Calcauso, where the mining company was only beginning negotiations, the 
migrants and villagers had strong disagreements. Migrants seemed to worry more about 
the environment and the cultural changes in the community. As one locale migrant from 
Calcauso said:  
What we want are fair and equal negotiations so that there is social harmony 
because the mine, like any other activity, is not the problem. The problem is how 
the mine operates, who should benefit from the mine to not generate social 
problems. What we migrants search for is balance and equality in participation, 
the mine should also play its social responsibility like it has to make some 
mediated programs [in the short term] and in the long term a sustainable 
program for 50 to 100 years for our new generations within reason because once 
they extract our riches, the mine is no longer viable and it will leave our land 
scorched and polluted; this is the danger that is looming for our community. 
 
Migrants from Calcauso and Mollebamba were the most in disagreement on the 
question whether ‘political organization is beneficial to negotiations with the mines,’ 
with a negative correlation for AoM participants from Mollebamba, the village where 
mining negotiations already had taken place (Figures 56 and 57). Therefore, it seems that 




satisfied with the current state of political organization among their communities. Indeed, 
mining operations have influenced much political, social, and economic change in these 
communities, changes that are, unfortunately, not always for the better. 
Mining’s Effects on CPO, Community, and Local Economy 
 The mining operations have made such an impact in these villages that there were 
noticeable effects in many aspects of the CPO, community, and local economy. Some of 
these changes included a weakening of the CPO relationship between the villages and 
locales, an increasing generation gap, and a loss of the traditional moral economy. 
Customary Political Organization (CPO) 
The effect of mining on customary political organization (CPO) and vice versa 
can be grouped primarily in three broad themes: the weakening of CPO ties between 
villages and locales, corruption of the authorities, and land management. Mining was also 
affecting the political landscape and the traditional land titling process through the 
encouragement of capital investment strategies by the government, which was creating a 
less cohesive political organization in the community that was more susceptible to 
individual land divisions of traditionally communally-held lands. Here, I will briefly 
explain each of these themes while showing evidence from the interview data in the form 




The weakening of customary political organizational ties. 
The political organization of the indigenous people of what is today Peru has a 
long history that predates the Spanish colonial times and was suppressed during the 
colonial period as detailed previously in the Context/Background chapter. Furthermore, 
in the 1980’s the Shining Path severely weakened the political structure in Indigenous 
communities. One interviewee from Mollebamba explained how the community became 
divided and lost trust in the authorities, and some individuals in particular who agreed to 
the mining operations. She stated that: 
In different places I have heard that [villagers] will be fighting [about the mine] 
while the President of the community is taking money [from the mine] under the 
table. People have told me this in various locations and this will never see the 
light of day because this is hidden...also because they are safe and assured while 
we are fighting among ourselves, this continues until now. 
 
According to the surveys in the locales, 65.2% of all respondents see their 
connection to the villages as “moderate”, while 16% and 37.5% of respondents from 
Calcauso and Mollebamba respectively felt that their relationship was “weak”.  
Interestingly, Mollebamba, where the mine had already been developed for more than 
fifteen years, reported one instance of selfishness regarding the relationship between 
villagers and locale migrants, while 16.0% of respondents from Calcauso reported that 
the relationship was “strong”, but the mine appeared to be changing that (Table 11). 
Table 13: Perceptions of villager and migrant relations 
Village Calcauso Mollebamba 
Strong Relationship 16.0% 0.0% 
Moderate Relationship 68.0% 62.5% 





This will be touched on again in the Discussion chapter while exploring the theme 
of the psychological pressure of modernization. Finally, 44.4% of respondents agreed that 
external factors like mining were the principal causes for weakening political 
organization in the community. Among respondents, 15.91% said that they believed that 
globalization/neoliberalism (i.e. the opening-up of domestic markets for exploitation by 
foreign governments and companies) was the second major factor causing a weakening in 
the relationship between migrants and villagers (Figure 43).  
 
 
Figure 11 - Weakening relationship between villages and locales. 
Corruption of the authorities 
The corruption of the authorities, and the people in general, concerned migrants of 
the locales and also the members of the villages. Unfortunately, the authorities were not 




their own assemblies. Furthermore, increasingly people began to want to serve as an 
authority in the village just because of the economic connection opportunities and not to 
benefit and further the community. This trend began in the communities with the arrival 
of the mining industry arrived and has only magnified since then. As one respondent 
from Mollebamba said, "...they [the ancestors] worked for the love of the village and the 
people, not for the economy like today; now just for money people want to be President 
[of the community]”. Most members of the community highly agreed that the authorities 
were receiving some kind of economic benefit from the mining companies and this 
situation created disagreement and less social cohesiveness and respect for their own 
authorities. One member of the community of Mollebamba explained it like this: 
So what happened with these people? With the President, Vice President, Fiscal 
Secretary, [the whole administration], I believe they have been receiving 
[payoffs] because I see them doing well economically...some of them received 
[payoffs], others were forced by the mining company to sign [the contract] in 
Abancay [the regional capital], so they will have given them [payoffs]. 
 
A similar situation occurred in the community of Calcauso where conflicts started 
after the mining company arrived in the village and began trying to gain the acceptance 
of the community. The community decided by majority, in the assembly by a public vote, 
to accept the mining enterprise. In recent negotiations with the mining companies, the 
authorities found that some signatures had been given without the permission of the 
people in the community or assembly. Later the community realized that the negotiations 




community.  At that point, the conflict in Calcauso against the authorities started. 
According to one interviewee from Calcauso:  
Just recently what happened was that the authorities signed [the mining 
contract]. Why did they sign!? We think they gave [the authorities] some amount 
under the table. How much could they have given them? While us, who are we? 
…So since this moment the divisionism has arrived. 
 
Participants in both communities and their locales strongly agreed that the 
corruption of the authorities and members of the communities was the most negative 
impact since the mining industry had arrived in those communities. As a result, there was 
less trust of the community toward their own authorities.  The primary ways that the 
mining companies brought corruption to village political management was through the 
weakening of customary political organizational ties, land management and titling 
disagreements, and through manipulative strategies. 
People of the locales related this corruption to the corruption at the national and 
state levels, they feared this type of corruption was now coming to local communities. As 
one migrant community member explained: 
We are in this problem that we don’t want the national scale corruption of the 
country to be repeated [here]... so this situation has already created a culture of 
authorities like this and I believe the people that want to become authorities 
already have more of an economic vision not to serve [or guide] the people 
 
Conflict between locales and villages 
As touched upon above, the conflict between the two villages I researched started 
at the beginning of the mining operations in Mollebamba. The primary concern at the 
moment of this investigation was that the surrounding communities’ traditional land 




mobilize to not sell land to the mining company. One respondent from the community of 
Mollebamba explained how this began: 
They [the mining company] told us they would give us such and such 
amount...there were two proposals: one to sell and one to rent what was 
convenient for the community. Well, many people almost wanted to accept selling, 
luckily the information spread to the neighboring villages. Vito, Calcauso, Silco 
all came as a commission to [protest], so it was accepted to just rent [the land]. 
 
At the same time, people from the community of Calcauso complained about the 
decision-making process in Mollebamba which had not allowed the participation of the 
other communities such as Calcauso. This was especially offensive to Calcauso as it was 
the village primarily affected by these land developments, because the river that runs by 
Calcauso was expected to be the first to witness contamination. Calcauso is closer to the 
initial brunt of potential contaminated river exposure and thus wanted to be consulted. A 
member of the village of Calcauso explained the disagreement: 
Mollebamba went ahead without consulting us, and we are the first ones affected 
by the [headwater] contamination, flora, fauna, plants, trout, and animals are in 
at risk of being polluted...they did not give us the ability to participate in the 
assemblies when they [Mollebamba] had a meeting with the company 
Buenaventura...so they just did this internally without even consulting at least 
with their children who are residing in Lima and other cities...Mollebamba 
regrets [this decision] now that the mine has finished with the exploration of 
about 10 years...  now recently [Mollebamba] has consulted with the migrants of 
Lima and now they say, “The [the mine] cheated us terribly”, and they have 
recently suspended [the company] and now they are in constant renegotiation. 
 
In the first round of negotiation in the community of Mollebamba, the migrants 
had less participation because the village disagreed with the locale’s participation in the 
negotiation with the mining company. This was because most of the migrants were not 




between these two groups to be carried out properly. It takes time to coordinate and reach 
consensus between two organizations through this type of CPO, which requires a high-
level of direct democratic participation to be successful. As one interviewee said, “In 
reality, thanks to Calcauso, when Mollebamba signed [the contract] an organization 
came to make mitin [protest]”  
Land management 
Land management in the villages was based on the traditional reciprocal work of 
ayni, minka, and chaqma described in the Literature Review chapter, which helped 
develop social relations between members of these communities. Furthermore, a very 
important responsibility of the village authorities was to help manage the land. The 
traditional work that had been practiced for millennia in these communities was changing 
rapidly during recent years as the amount of mining increased in these places. Because of 
different land use norms and patterns held by the mining companies, some villagers were 
concerned that the land practices that had sustained them for so long would soon be in 
jeopardy. As one respondent said:   
Speaking about the community of Calcauso, we rotate the ‘chaqma’ (community 
field planting), every year we designate a new site...the land has to rest 4 to 5 
years and after that we rotate it again through the community. Each community 
member gets two years [of use], the first year [they plant] potatoes, the second 
year vegetables...when we do this process of exchange between community 
members we call it ‘comiso’. And to care for [these lands and their crops] we call 
‘camayoc’. 
 
This statement showed how intimately connected the people of the village were with the 




use, equal labor, and equal benefit by all members of the community of this land. The 
fact that the words for these practices are mostly all words from Quechua is important to 
note linguistically, as words or concepts that come from one culture or language often are 
maintained in that same language, especially if no other adequate substitute exists in the 
dominant language of the society (Schmitt & Marsden, 2006).  This means that these land 
practices were most probably of indigenous origin and pre-dated the arrival of the 
Spanish and their language.  
 Furthermore, villagers expressed concern over the loss of family and community 
relations due to the mine entering into business in the region. As one Calcauso villager 
described when asked about how the mine had changed community relations due to the 
influence of money: 
Before there was ‘ayni’ (reciprocal work-trade) between 4 to 10 people daily, 
now they want to be paid instead. Even the children want money. The local 
government program recruits people when there is work and now we don’t work 
together in the fields, with this program you recruit people only with money [and 
not work-trade]. 
 
Another respondent said about this government program: 
The program completely corrupts the new generation especially the mothers and 
the people that do not dedicate themselves to agriculture. Now they are 
accustomed to eating junk food and there is no motivation to plant. Agriculture 
has failed with this program and that is why people are sick, they are not giving 
natural food to their children. 
 
Respondents indicated that this program that the government brought to local 
communities was making people more dependent on outside services and many people 
were simply waiting for jobs from this program instead working in their fields to produce 




These changes in land management practices in these communities was affecting 
free space that they used to have. Traditional communal land management in the 
community of Mollebamba close to the urban area has become more private than 
communal land. For example, people started to build fences and separate from each other 
in order to title lands that for generations belonged to their family. This created conflicts 
between families and communities because everyone wanted to build a fence for their 
own plot in the village and surrounding areas. As one interviewee from Mollebamba said 
“I don’t even have a place to go to the bathroom freely, everything is fenced and walled 
in.” 
Land titling disagreements 
When asked whether land titling is beneficial for the community in the survey, 
there were two positions with the villages and locales largely divided. 67.7% of villagers 
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that “land titling is beneficial for the 
community”, while only 34.7% of migrants agreed with the same statement.  Multi-
variant correlation tests yielded results that showed that village of origin was the most 
important independent variable.16 The community had been struggling with the process of 
land titling arriving in these communities and it had been a very complex process that 
often generated more conflict between families and members of the community. A 
former President of the community of Calcauso, said in the assembly that  
Titling land [individually] does not benefit our community in the long term, 
instead we should find a way to title the whole the village. We know there is 
                                                 
16 Being a villager from Calcauso shows a weak correlation with believing that land titling is beneficial for 




pressure by the mining companies to title the land so they can easily enter our 
land, because as communally-held land it is harder for them to deal with, but if 
everything were private it would be easy to buy those lands.”  
 
A woman from Calcauso manifested her concern about land titling of communal 
agricultural fields, "The houses can be titled, but not the fields.”  
Some people such as  a man interviewed from Calcauso were in favor of land 
titling because it would help bring financial structure and authority to people’s property 
holdings, this would in turn, allow them to obtain credit from the banks. He said, “Land 
titling [can be] advantageous because of the financial security it brings, if you do not 
have a title to your property to do a loan with, not having these facilities can be 
negative”. Similarly, a man interviewed from Calcauso detailed the debate taking place in 
these communities over land titling and the advantages and disadvantages that came with 
that: 
"Well I think each one has advantages and disadvantages ...we must have our 
goods formalized in the urban area to be able to say that this is mine, but in 
possession any problem can become worse, for me yes I agree, but also what is 
coming suddenly could be the payment of property assessment..[land titling] has 
also come out in an assembly for approval ...the whole majority in an assembly 
all said ‘Yes’ to [land titling in the urban area] and then COFOPRI [state 
property assessment agency] entered Mollebamba, then there was divisionism 
[among people who wanted land titling and those who did not] .. some said that ‘I 
will not title [my land]’ and there were others who wanted to...so maybe there 
was a misunderstanding … [also] possibly the Mayor saw some good benefit for 
the population by having a title, for example, if one wanted to participate in the 
new roof program [from the State], for me the intention by the Mayor was to see 
the people orderly with their land titled” 
 
A man from the community of Mollebamba affirmed that land titling could be good 




COFOPRI is good because it will prioritize your right to your house, you can sell 
it [for example]...in the indigenous times we paid ‘alcabala’ because we had 
some land; my father paid this tax every semester or monthly, when we had 
harvests, depending on how much you produced, so you would produce a lot of 
food to pay the Velazco government [their taxes].  
 
On the other hand, there were participants from all communities I researched that 
were also apprehensive about land titling. For example, a woman from the village of 
Calcauso said she believed that the community needed more investigation about this 
subject because it was something new for the community and some people did not 
understand some of the consequences of these actions. She said: 
“Land titling will happen here and I do not know if it will be good because maybe 
in the future our homes and things will be seized by the State, I am thinking in the 
taxes we have to pay right? We need more investigation about this because if this 
happens, we don’t have work as you see [to pay the taxes].” 
 
The vice president of the Community of Calcauso also acknowledged that they needed 
more information about this subject. He agreed that: 
"We are not well trained about this project from COFOPRI to title lands. Two 
years ago [COFOPRI] entered the District [of Juan Espinoza Medrano] and one 
year ago they titled Mollebamba, and well this year [2017] other 
communities...like in the city, overtime, we will come to pay property taxes to the 
State.” 
 
People from the village seemed to understand that they did not have enough 
money to pay taxes to the government for the land that they owned, and this was a major 
concern about the prospect of land titling. In addition, they were concerned about the 
inadequate knowledge that these State institutions operated on about how communal land 
functioned in their communities. As a village leader from Calcauso complained: 
"We are not in conditions to pay the State for the communal use [of land]...here 




the problems of the communal lands, of titling, and of the urban centers. 
COFOPRI comes and they don’t know what to say.” 
 
Another, concern from the people in the villages was that if the land becomes 
private it would be difficult to organize the community and people will lose interest in the 
communal assemblies and duties in the community. As one woman said,  
There are people that want to privatize here, there should be no private property 
because when there is private property the owner of that land does not want to 
hear about anything “communal”...they no longer participate in the [communal] 
labor and assemblies.  
 
This point about land titling is important because it affects the ability of mines to 
gain access to land, and land titling had already happened in Mollebamba and there were 
some disagreements because of this decision, so these results make sense prima facie and 
will be explored more below. 
Community 
 The effect of mining on the community of the villages and locales and vice versa 
can be divided into two broad themes: how participants would like to see their villages in 
the future and a generation gap that was increasing. Moreover, external factors, 
encouraged by the entrance of the mining industry were changing village and migrant 
socio political relations primarily through the entrance of modern neoliberal  values such 
us individualism, competition, monetization, and self-interested local politics.  
How participants would like to see their village in the future 
I asked a question in the survey concerning how the participants would like to see 




and 73.68% of Mollebamba respondents said they wanted to see their village have a 
healthy environment in the future. Needless to say, with most respondents in favor of 
mining and simultaneously concerned about contamination of the environment, these 
results are curious and will be addressed in detail in the Discussion chapter of this thesis. 
Another curious result I will elaborate on in the Discussion chapter, is that it appears that 
Calcauso was keen to see more development and economic opportunities while 
Mollebamba was concerned about maintaining language and cultural practices into the 
future.  
 





Figure 13 - Mollebamba: How do you want your village to look in the future? 
Generation gap 
As introduced above, there was evidence of a generation gap and various migrants 
alluded to the fact that they saw the relationship between generations getting weaker over 
time. This was noticeable both in terms of the generation gap and the feelings about 
participation in village politics by migrants of the locale. As one man from Mollebamba 
said,  
There does not exist [political participation] for the new generation...we are 
[elderly and] already finished, so I don’t know where the youth that are not 
familiar with reality will take us in the end. 
 
The elders were concerned about the lack of emerging leadership among the young 
people, because the youth seemed to not listen to advice from the elder generation and the 
gap was getting stronger each year. A woman from Mollebamba indicated: 
 
[The new generation] they only search for land [to buy] and look towards the 




barbed wire for everything. There is no space in any parts, everything is with 
barbed wire...The new generation eats different than we do [preferring sodas and 
sweets] to what we ate before like chuno, lawa, and saralawa thus there was more 
respect with the food, the grandmothers and grandfathers were very strong, now 
the young people don’t do anything. The situation is complicated here, but it must 
be this way everywhere, right? 
 
The elders of the community did not understand why this change was happening so 
rapidly.  The unwillingness of young people to listen to and learn from stories of the past 
in order to plan for the future was not a good sign for the older generation. According to 
one elder:  
 
The new generation has over-generalized the past so that for them there is no 
past, only the present and the future. ‘The past is already over’, they say, and they 
don’t want to know anything about the past...sometimes they just silence us...I just 
go to the assemblies, I look, I listen, and sometimes when they say something to 
me, I participate. If I participate too long [the new generation] will become 
bored. 
 
Local economy changes due to mining  
There were some shifts of the traditional economy in these villages toward 
consumerism as many of the interviews described. The differences between Mollebamba 
and Calcauso were that since the mining had entered Mollebamba more than 10 years 
earlier, the economy had changed strongly and many people, especially men, were 
working in the mine and not in their own land. This meant that women had to work by 
themselves in the field and they could not do that well because much of the work in the 
field requires both men and women. It is necessary for both sexes to work because men 




the chaquitaclla, whereas women usually play the role of planting the seeds and small 
plants.   
As the people from Mollebamba already had had experiences with mining since 
the period of exploration began in the early 2000’s they had faced some significant 
changes in the local economy of the village as compared with Calcauso, which had yet to 
fully experience the economic effects of the mine, but which was still feeling the social 
and economic pressure of these dramatic changes to their neighboring village. According 
to my quantitative data, Mollebamba was more concerned about the future generation at 
the moment than Calcauso, which was more preoccupied with mining negotiations and 
disagreements between villagers and migrants over the future of mining. Some of the 
effects of the mining that Mollebamba had seen included a shift in the price of labor and 
a loss of the traditional economy, while some of the effects of the mining that Calcauso 
had seen included increased social and economic pressure to modernize. 
Due to this context with the mining, everyone was only consuming and buying 
food from the store. As one interviewee mentioned, “The driver who came with the car to 
sell product [told me] he has noticed a strong change before and after the mining 
operation as people are just buying food at any price.” It seemed the impact of new foods 
and work habits was strongly affecting the community of Mollebamba, which had almost 
completely changed their livelihood. The most affected were the elderly due to their 
being accustomed to traditional work habits and relations. Because work was such an 
integral part of the development and maintenance of social relationships in these 




that still relied on this type of social organization. There were still people of this older 
generation that wanted to maintain this type of traditional local economy that was not 
based in money, but in work-sharing and the well-being of all members of the 
community.  
In Calcauso, with the recent arrival of mining, they were just beginning to face 
this type of similar economic pressure and development. As one respondent from 
Calcauso said: 
“Calcauso is trying to improve putting houses with tin roofs [instead of straw]. 
Unfortunately, some people are still building the roofs of their houses with straw. 
In Mollebamba almost all of the houses have tin roofs and are made of cement 
and brick [not adobe].”  
 
Many people that I interviewed made this same observation, that a sign of economic 
prosperity from the mine was the structural improvement of people’s homes. 
Economic disparity 
Through the customary political and labor practices of these villages, major 
economic disparity had largely been avoided, until now. The disparity of the distribution 
of wealth was the most visible in the town of Mollebamba where before the mining 
arrived it used to be more equal. Development used to work for everyone without anyone 
taking advantage, but instead helping and sharing with each other. This has been noted 
above in regard to the lack of respect for the elders that had emerged where work-sharing 
was concerned. Before, when any elderly person wanted support in their land people 
would go there and help them without asking for money; instead, the elderly people 




work that is slowly disappearing. As a village elder from Mollebamba said: “Minka was 
work we did for the elders, for the widows, for those people that needed help from the 
population.” 
Unfortunately, the new generation are losing these values and the elderly are very 
concerned about the loss of these traditions and values that seems to be fading within the 
community. As a woman from Mollebamba said: 
“When you get older then the people don’t want [to help you]. I didn’t put 
anything in the field because it is difficult [there is no one to help]. I don’t know 
what I am going to eat, this is why I must go and work. And when I do request 
work collaboration they want 50 soles, from where am I going to pay this!? As 
elderly people [the government] gives us something and with this I have to 
live...some people are developing their houses and they have cars, and for us, 
nothing...They all already have a car, those that had their fields close to the mine, 
they receive the money, and for us, nothing. This is why we are arguing, because 
come are complaining that the mine gave some people a lot of money, and for 
us?” 
 
The elderly people were the most vulnerable to these changes because they needed young 
people that could help them in the traditional work such as chaqma and minka. Without 
this type of collaborative work, it was impossible for the elderly to work by themselves.   
The traditional moral economy in these communities was based in the exchange 
of product and work that was called trueque.  This type of exchange was well known in 
the Andes. This happened where people, known as arrieros, from the villages would 
travel long distances in order to exchange their products and bring them to the village. 
The exchange for this food was usually done with clothing or food that was not available 




distances between them learned to exchange potatoes with salt or sugar, etc. One man 
recounted his memory of the arrieros:  
I remember seeing my father three times bring four to five mules...and he would 
bring us sugar, noodles, things that did not exist because there were no merchants 
like now where you can buy bread. To get bread there were people that travelled 
and they brought us [bread and noodles] that is how we came to know about 
eating bread and sugar as well. 
 
In this region until the 1980s most of the economy was still based on trueque. In just a 
few short years the differences in the economy of this area had shifted completely. 
Highways and infrastructure brought a new economy based on monetary value and 
because now cars could bring products from the coast or jungle one just needed the 
money to purchase them. 
Loss of the Traditional Moral Economy 
While labor prices increased to around 40-50 soles ($12.37- $15.47) for a day of 
work due to the mine’s influence, this was not positive for everyone in the community. 
As one village leader said, "With agriculture there is no return anymore because they 
[the average worker] charge you 40-50 soles. From where are we going to get this 
quantity?” In general, for most workers, it was probably good that wages were rising, 
however one village elder was quick to note that, “The elderly are not going to benefit 
from this because they can only work at the mine until the age of 50”. Equally, as 
mentioned above women have been being restricted from this work due to a lack of 
proper certifications or licenses. This means that while the elderly and women will be 
excluded from the labor force, the traditional economy that they have relied on for 




traditional forms of work trade like ayni, minka, and chaqma that have been so rapidly 
disappearing.  
As explained above, ayni, minka, and chaqma were traditional forms of work 
trade that Quechua communities engaged for centuries. Most often it consisted of one 
person or a group of people helping out another group with certain large projects like 
building a home, tilling or harvesting a large field, or some other community project. 
These work trades might not be paid back for many seasons or years, but it was one of 
the elements that maintained cohesiveness in these villages; if someone owed another 
person work in the future, no one was going to try and destroy that relationship through 
selfishness, greed, or other negative actions. Thus, the loss of this traditional moral 
economy could engender more division in the community. As one respondent stated 
simply “Ayni and minka will disappear because people just want money.” This type of 
traditional work was explained in detail by and elder from (Mollebamba): 
If we bring up the history of these systems of work [ayni and minka] it is the 
inheritance of our ancestors, from the Incas this system comes and it worked 
perfectly up until I was a teenager. For example, minka was a job for elderly 
people, widows, and others who needed help from the population. Ayni was a 
reciprocal work trade, today for me, tomorrow for you. Mita was a type of 
communal work like for repairing canals, roads, and unfortunately with the 
appearance of the mine these systems of work are disappearing...Calcauso has 
gone backwards abysmally. For example, the elderly and the widows, among 
other populations, are relatively abandoned because everything is focused on 
money, in productivity and production.  
 
Another point made by respondents was about people’s attitudes and diets changing with 
the loss of this traditional moral economy. When asked about this, Stanis’s wife 




changed their attitudes and behaviors for negative ones. The children now are different, 
they don’t eat toasted corn anymore, just food from the store.”  Another woman added to 
this point: 
Before in your old age, the youth would help with ayni or any type of reciprocity 
work, they would also help without pay, but now everything is paid…’If you pay 
me like the mine 40 soles, then I will go to your field’, that is how the new 
generation answers [when you ask for assistance], and all this the mine has 
caused to change a lot. Now, with the mine, it has corrupted and cheated the 
people and exploited the community members...I am always debating in the 
assembly because I notice why the community has had their rights cheated, 
sometimes because, I am elderly, they tell me, ‘Why do you complain?’ 
 
This response helps show that not only are monetary and economic factors important for 
the traditional moral economy, but also how the loss of this economy was affecting 
people’s attitudes, diets, and village cohesiveness. In many ways, this observation 
encompassed the major themes of the changes that are taking place in these villages due 
to the pressures of globalization, and especially the local mining industry, including the 




Table 14: Similarities and Differences between CPO in Calcauso and Mollebamba 
Characteristics Calcauso Mollebamba 
Land Management (Ostrom, 
2008) 
Communal Communal/Private 
Institution Type (Pejovich, 
1999; Helmke and Levitsky 
2004) 
Substitutive Substitutive 
Session frequency Twice a week Twice a week 
Duration of sessions 2 hours 2 hours 
Assembly frequency Every month Every month 
Duration of assemblies 2-3 hours All day 
Village authorities Mostly men aged 30-60 Mostly men aged 30-60 
Stage of mining negotiations Accepted Exploration 
Stage in July 2017 
Completed Exploration 
Stage in 2012, currently in 
negotiations about the 
Extraction Phase. 
Voting rights  Anyone from the 
village or locale 
Only active village 
members 
Connection to locales Was strong, but is now 
becoming strained due 
to differences over 
mining negotiations 
Was strained due to 
differences over previous 
mining negotiations, now 
is improving due to 






Chapter 5: Discussion 
In this chapter, I will explain how my research results relate to the theories and 
concepts presented in the Literature Review. The main ideas discussed here are 
indigenous peoplehood (Thomas, 1990; Holm et al., 2003), effective and ineffective 
formal and informal institutions (Pejovich, 1999; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004), institutional 
bricolage (De Koning & Cleaver, 2012; Rogers, 2012), Ostrom’s (2008) eight principles 
of common pool resource management, and the geographic scale of mining negotiation 
participation (Muradian et al.,2003).  
The complex political structure of indigenous communities throughout the Andes 
includes their migrant communities that have helped shape a unique form of organization. 
This relationship in recent decades has been disrupted due to different changes and the 
entrance of outsider entities such as transnational mining companies that often have not 
included these migrant communities’ participation in negotiation processes. As a result, 
these communities have seen the weakening of the customary relationship between 
villages and migrant communities, which has created more social conflict and less 
cohesive political organization even as the long-term negotiation processes with the 
mining companies have been underway. Villages seemed to be the most affected by these 
negotiations. Examples of this included the division between migrants and villagers, 
social hierarchies, environmental destruction and loss of traditions. These situations often 
did not ensure wellbeing and a better standard of life for the people, instead it generated 




their own development. Based on my interviews, it was clear the values of the authorities 
had completely altered because the value of being a village authority or working to 
benefit the community was diminishing. Meanwhile the value of wage labor was 
increasing.  This situation appeared to have created less trust between community 
members and their authorities as well as less trust between the villages and locales. 
However more studies of other villages with and without mining operations are necessary 
to confirm these results.  Furthermore, the division and disagreement in the initial 
negotiation with the mining companies has created a platform that could end up giving 
unequal benefit to the mining corporations because of the lack of agreement and 
participation in the bargaining negotiation process by the migrant community and all 
members of the villages.  
The negotiation process with mining companies takes many years. Calcauso has 
been involved in a long process of negotiation that had taken almost one decade since 
different companies arrived in the community and tried to obtain the community’s 
consent. Obtaining the consent of the community, or the social license to operate, is 
where the process of negotiation with mining companies and the relationship with the 
community begins (Williams, 2012). This long process of negotiation can generate 
political deterioration between different interest groups, such as the villagers and locales, 
and this conflict can damage the long term unity of the political organization between 
these groups.  
In the case of Calcauso, the migrant community used to have a strong relationship 




from the time when the migrant community began their political organization in the city. 
This relationship has changed due to the different aspirations and interests of people from 
the migrant community and the villages. Throughout my interviews, there was a pattern 
of migrants disagreeing more with the mining operation than villagers. However, many 
indicated that if the mining operation were to be allowed by the village, then they should 
have the best negotiation possible to benefit the community. In complex democratic 
organizations, the process of consensus can take longer than in less complex and less 
democratic political organizations due to these differences of opinion (Mainwaring, 
2006). 
Interviews also indicated that public opinion in the District of JEM regarded 
Calcauso as having a reputation as a very unified, organized, and cohesive community. 
People from Mollebamba recognized that Calcauso has this type of reputation in the 
district and in the whole county based on interviews conducted in the summer of 2017. 
Even so, the negotiation process that took place in 2017 led to conflict and disagreement 
between the village of Calcauso and their migrant community in Lima. Due to this long 
process and the uncertainty over what costs or benefits mining might bring, the 
assemblies witnessed more conflict between members of the community. Every month in 
the assemblies the same problem of mining was discussed, which eventually wore the 
community down.  In addition, as explained by Williams (2012) above, the strategies of 
clientelism, favoritism, and bribery that corporations used to keep the leadership of the 
community on their side resulted in a bad perception of the leadership by members of the 




of self-reliance and more dependence on external factors and institutions in regard to land 
management rules under the traditional economy by community members.  
 My findings are supported by literature suggesting that almost all Andean 
communities who have had migrants move to the city have strong political and social ties 
with their villages of origin (Wallace, 1984; Adams & Golte, 1990). These relationships 
depend on the geographical scale of their population, social values, family ties, and their 
customary political organization.  
Indigenous Identity  
The concept of indigenous identity is poorly understood or developed in these 
communities and their locales. Young people with higher education are more likely to 
have a contemporary understanding about indigenous identity.  According to my 
qualitative data, this lack of understanding about the current concept of indigenous 
identity is related to language usage and the prejudice against the word “indigenous”. 
Furthermore, many participants in my interviews preferred to identify as peasants and 
less as Indian, particularly because this word is associated with strong racism. It is an 
insult to call somebody indio (Altamirano-Jiménez, 2013). 
Through the interviews and survey responses it became clear that the concept of 
indigenousness was new for most of the respondents and needed to be explained. For 
example, one respondent was asked in the survey if he identified with his indigenous 
identity, instead of answering in the affirmative or negative he asked, “What do you mean 




of questions were very common throughout the interviews and surveys. Furthermore, 
elderly people were more likely to respond with, “I do not know what indigenous is”. 
When I mentioned the term “Indian”, most of them, especially the elders, rejected the 
term and some of them explained me in a nice way that “Indians are in the Puna (the 
highest and poorest part of the Andes), most of them they do not speak Spanish, and they 
lived with llamas and alpacas, so I think we still have some Indian people, but not a lot”. 
This situation reflected what is known about the colonial mentality and the influence of 
the changes of identity by outsider entities such us the State with the imposition of the 
term indio and eventually peasant. As many authors have also discovered, this 
manipulation of language and terminology has created much confusion for the indigenous 
Quechua of the Andes today (Lobo et al., 2016). Furthermore, even though the traditions, 
language, and land practices are still in place, it does not matter for them if legally they 
are not recognized as indigenous and cannot receive their due benefits and rights. 
Although this research does not attempt to focus on the profound debate about 
indigenous identity, it does acknowledge that these communities are indigenous based on 
the framework of peoplehood explained in the Literature Review Chapter. According to 
the theory of peoplehood, marginalized indigenous peoples can advocate for, and 
revalidate, the origins and ethnicity of these communities as an indigenous people due to 
their common history, language, cycles of ceremony, and their continued connection 
with, and management of, the land they still inhabit (Thomas, 1990; Varese & Chirif, 
2006). This interconnected characteristic of the peoplehood theory is manifested in very 




In the context of resources extraction, one member of the village of Mollebamba 
noted about this indigenous past, “The mining is not something new since the colonial 
times. Our ancestors confronted many abuses due to the extraction of minerals without 
any pay, as an example there are places well-known for their notorious exploitation and 
physical evidence exists even until today”.  Furthermore, these communities have 
maintained their cycles of ceremonies through time and space. Although the loss of the 
tradition in the recent decades in the district of Juan Espinoza Medrano has increased and 
fewer people are practicing ceremonies to the Pachamama such as: waka tinka, and llama 
tinka, today most of the people celebrate the ceremonies as part of traditional festivities. 
However, it seemed that fewer people continued the traditional practice in their daily life.  
The sacred land is also related to certain places considered to be spiritual land; however, 
the geographical and physical boundaries of these communities is also legitimately 
administered by the members of these communities creating a type of mixed indigenous 
Andean and Western liberal model of livelihood and societal management. 
It is important to acknowledge in the debate over the future maintenance of the 
language the incorporation of modern technologies and the education system to further 
the use of Quechua. If this is not done, the new generation will continue losing their 
interest to speak their native language especially within the locales of the cities where 
migrants often face loneliness, racism, and discrimination.  Thus, it is possible that a new 
framework is required to define the political organization of these modern indigenous 
communities.  As some authors (Adams & Golte, 1990; Kirk, 1991; Starn, 1992; Solari & 




identify indigenous people who migrate to the city and live far away from their traditional 
homeland. Due to economic pressure, these ethnic groups are spatially segregated. This 
relationship between villages of origin and migrant communities (locales) deserves 
further research. Lobo et al. (2016) framework of ‘ethnopolitical boundaries’, for 
example, notes cases in which migrant people still maintain their connection with the 
villages, and in the case of not achieving success or accustoming themselves to the city 
life, they always have their land that will be a part of them, if they wanted to return again 
to their homeland.  
This discussion might help with gaining recognition of migrant communities’ 
indigenous associations. As detailed above, the organizations of migrant communities 
were created as informal organizations that today have become legal institutions. These 
organizations were capable of incorporating their culture, traditions, and community 
awareness through cultural spaces in urban areas, often without any legitimization by the 
formal institutions of the state. However, they were able to reclaim cultural significance 
and advocate for legal legitimization of their traditional festivities and traditional customs 
by migrants through their channels of informal and formal institutions in the city. These 
studies suggested that there be more research into how indigenous political organization 
functions in different spaces and contexts. 
Effective and Ineffective, Formal and Informal Institutions 
Throughout the Andes many communities have a direct or indirect relationship 




how rural peasants influenced the process of configuration of the city of Lima. The 
institutions in both communities share similarities such as their own statutes and book of 
laws that needs to be approved by a sanctioned State institution. As Helmke and Levitsky 
(2004) explained, many communities included in this research are recognized by formal 
State institutions, though they operate under both written, and at times, informal and 
unwritten rules. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the political motivations of 
the State and other formally sanctioned institutions toward informal institutions such as 
the village assemblies and locales can be dangerous as they may inadvertently cause the 
rejection and de-legitimization of any kind of informal organizations. This 
dichotomization undermines the customary political organization that informal 
institutions often rely on. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) explained that informal 
institutions can shape the outcomes of formal institutions, this understanding can bring 
other questions such as to what degree these outcomes can be changed, and by 
whom?  Furthermore, they mentioned that, “We need to know more about what induces 
state actors to formalize rather than oppose informal institutions” (Helmke & Levitsky, 
2004 p. 734). I hope this study can help actors from formal institutions to understand and 
reach out to those from more informal institutions. Doing this would make these formal 
State institutions more effective and would enable the informal institutions of these 
communities go from being Substitutive institutions to Complementary institutions 
(Helmke & Levitsky, 2004).  
In this regard, Ostrom (2010) explained the mechanisms whereby communities 




legitimization of their own organization among members. (Ostrom, 2010) named six 
“attributes of micrositutaions” and claimed that they are the primary ways that 
individuals develop trust of each other within commonly managed resources (Ostrom, 
2010, p. 661). These attributes apply to all communities that practice CPR and include 
the need for open communication between members. These attributes include known 
reputations and histories of members, high marginal per capita return (MPCR), ability to 
enter and exit organization easily, a long-term vision by the community about the use and 
benefit of said resources, and a system of rules and penalties. These attributes can help to 
bridge the gap of communication that has traditionally existed between indigenous 
communities and the State, which often lacks understanding of both the local political 
structure and its function in the communities where mining is arriving. By focusing on 
developing these attributes, the State could help to build a bridge between formal and 
informal institutions that could create more cooperation between institutions. Improving 
the relationship between the informal and formal institutions means both recognizing and 
increasing the rights of CPR management by the local communities, including control 
over their mineral resources while improving the effectiveness of formal institutions in 
their communities.  
Formal institutions can be made more effective by adhering to and fulfilling the 
six clear attributes explained by Ostrom (2010) regarding local community operations 
based on trust, consent, and mutual agreement among CPR members. In this sense, it 
should also be recognized that informal institutions play a vital role in the management 




companies in the difficult and complex decisions about mining and development in these 
communities. As these communities have traditionally managed the CPR in a sustainable 
manner, it is important for the State and mining companies to assume some of the 
attributes of members of these communities by adhering to these guidelines. This seems 
to be one of the best proven ways, theoretically and empirically, to generate progress, 
trust, and legitimization within the community and among all stakeholders and thereby 
ensure the best chance for economic success and prosperity.  
Indigenous communities have quite a different organization that includes 
traditional and modern mixed components within the political organizations such as 
democratic votes, offices of authority, regular assemblies, etc., making it a customary 
form of political organization. Meetings, land management, and assemblies are a part of 
customary organization that is often not recognized by formal rules or institutions. In 
particular, indigenous communities are characterized by their own ethics and rules and 
thus have different perceptions of what informality means. However, Helmke and 
Levitsky (2004) have formulated some of the key elements of the contrast of the 
interaction between informal institutions and effective versus ineffective formal 
institutions. This framework shows that these communities are more likely to see 
economic prosperity if they can work with effective informal institutions towards 
common goals. To this end, the State should work to make their institutions for mining 
more effective by making them more responsive and accepting of following the political 




Additionally, as Williams (2012) and Arellano (2008) mentioned in their studies, 
the lack of capacity of the State to create and enforce laws vis a vis companies that are 
operating in Peru is often because they favor neoliberal investment, and thus the 
mechanisms to control the law over those companies are weak. In this context, informal 
rules and procedures of these communities make the changes and demand that formal 
rules be put in practice.  As both communities rely on informal and formal institutions 
that produce rules to manage the resources and society in these communities, it is also 
important to recognize that the concept of “informal” institutions is a foreign idea to these 
communities, as these communities have been organized this way since before the 
colonial times. Furthermore, the idea of the “formal” institution has only been defined as 
it relates to modern institutions. Then can we call the institutions of the Inca Empire 
formal as well? In this case, these communities have always followed certain formal and 
informal rules through their political evolution until today. This ability to adapt local 
institutions to larger non-local institutions over time has enabled the survival of many 
aspects of Quechua CPO. In the recent context of the entrance of international companies 
to these communities, the village and locale assemblies have helped dictate how and 
under which conditions these companies can operate.  
According to many historical references and the nature of their institutions, 
governments have certain interests to regulate and control economic interests within their 
geographical boundaries. The incentive in recent decades to formalize informal 
organizations is due to the economic interest in control over resources. As mining 




government have a major interest in the inclusion of specific laws and recognition of 
these communities to ameliorate social conflict and provide less of a barrier to the 
entrance of the mining investment in these areas. Because the central government 
controls taxes levied on the mining operations, but does not distribute them equally, and 
the state government has been focusing on economic interests that make it easier for 
corporations to co-opt the government and force them to defend the interests of the 
corporation over citizens of local communities, the local village assemblies are not in a 
strong position to confront the State and multinational mining corporations. Instead, the 
unique shield the community has maintained is their CPO, which has included the 
migrant communities. However, as was clear from my interviews, the formal institutions 
of the State have attempted to create and implement all forms of rules and procedures to 
sanction any informal rules that encourage interaction between migrants and their village. 
Because the main economic investment in Peru is heavily dominated by the mining 
industry, the formal institutions of the government often help to generate a platform to 
support foreign companies’ investments and protect their interests, which are not 
necessarily the interests of the communities. The lack of capacity (or desire) by the 
government to guarantee the well-being of these communities is one of the main 
challenges of the central government. The economic development process is thus often 
implemented by ineffective formal institutions that not only operate in a top-down 
fashion, but often neglect their duty to advocate on behalf of indigenous communities.  
The inability of the Peruvian government to regulate and control the companies 




citizens’ trust in government and has caused many communities to take on substitutive 
roles in advocating for their own proper financial compensation, environmental concerns, 
and land management rights and inheritance (Arellano, 2008). Still, even if the State were 
to take on a more effective role as a formal institution in advocating for these 
communities, we must ask the question: would it really change the economic 
development outcome as Pejovich (1999) and Helmke and Levitsky (2004) claim? 
Norberg-Hodge (1991) analyzed this question in her book about a Tibetan village 
in Ladakh, a village that underwent nearly the same process of change that have 
happened to the villages of this study, only in a different context. Economic development, 
in the traditional material sense of the term, by a population with no outside influence can 
require generations. However, with the active intervention of the State and international 
companies the process can be much more rapid. Perhaps they can help to improve the 
economic viability of a region; but this does not necessarily guarantee that peoples’ 
standard of living will improve. These controversial issues are still an active part of the 
academic debate and deserve further investigation and analysis. Is the loss of values and 
culture worth development? More practically, how can standard of living increase while 
still encouraging and enriching local practices, customs, and concerns? What is the role 
of formal and informal institutions in this regard? And how can a balance between 
economic development based on mining and the political independence, social values, 





According to my data, both communities studied here have developed strong 
connections as a network with their migrant communities, reproducing their own rules 
and statutes. Perhaps this connection with migrant communities can develop positive 
outcomes for the community. In the context of indigenous communities in the developing 
world, analysis of formal and informal institutions as separate and divergent institutions 
leads to missing some of the key elements that make connections between these types of 
institutions more holistic. This leads to the theory of institutional bricolage that examines 
the different process and arrangement of the rules that communities develop through 
time. 
Bricolage 
“Bricolage addresses the plurality and the complex political dimensions of 
knowledge work” (Rogers, 2012. p. 14). This research attempted to understand the 
complexity of the political organization of the villages and locales without separating 
these institutions from the State government and mining negotiations. Instead, this 
research has attempted to provide the perspective of the communities as a holistic body, 
disagreements among members included. Thus, the concept of bricolage (Cleaver, 2012; 
Rogers, 2012) can enhance the theory of effective and ineffective formal institutions 
(Helmke & Levitsky, 2004) by expanding on the potential relationships within and 
between institutions that are neither formal nor informal in the traditional sense such as is 
often the case with indigenous communities. Additionally, this understanding can help to 




how the relationships between villages, locales, the central government, and international 
mining companies will transform in future contexts. 
In sum, these communities and villages consider their assemblies as important 
institutions for the reproduction of knowledge and in the best interest of the democratic 
participation in the decision-making process for the well-being of the community. 
Furthermore, those rules can change depending on the context of the participants and 
decision-making arrived at in the manner of consensus. They consider the assemblies as 
the maximum authority, which enables them to solve any communal problem. In this 
process, the theory of institutional bricolage (Cleaver, 2012; Rogers, 2012) combined 
with the theory of effective/ineffective formal/informal institutions (Pejovich, 1999; 
Helmke & Levitsky, 2004) can help us to understand how the processes of organization 
between these institutions function, what components can be modified and reused 
according to certain circumstances, and to what degree the relationships between the 
actors previously mentioned will be beneficial for all involved or not. Both communities 
and their migrant communities have a dynamic organization that interconnects them. 
These institutions are constantly changing and trying to maintain themselves meanwhile 
customary components of their own rules and sociocultural norms are in flux. Their own 
communal experience and customary way of managing their own institutions has helped 
interconnect these communities allowing them to confront their challenges. The theory of 
institutional bricolage (Cleaver, 2012; Rogers, 2012) can help us to understand as a 




Land management  
Customary forms of land management have direct influence on the customary 
political organization (CPO) of these communities and vice versa. These communities’ 
form of CPO has been evolving through time and space until today alongside with land 
and natural resource management. The rules and procedures designed by CPO are based 
on the structure, function, reuse, implementation, and practice of customary land and 
natural resource management. Both communities have similar resources and forms of 
land management that have been maintained for millennia. Thus, CPO has had an 
important influence on land and natural resources management.  As the customary land 
management has been maintained, reused, and implemented over time in different 
historical contexts, it can help to identify patterns of practice of sustainable land 
management that can share similarities with other ancient practices in other places. In 
other words, if the community did not have control of their communally held land, the 
type of political organization involved would have a different direction, structure, 
procedure, and components. This type of land management that is still practiced in both 
communities directly influences the way CPO was established.  
Ostrom’s (2008) eight principles for managing common pool resources resonate 
with the land management in both these communities. All the principles are practiced in 
these communities. Here, we can analyze some of the most important principles that are 
crucial to understand the importance of land management such as: the definite group 




community members, recognition of these rules by outside authorities, and a system to 
monitor and sanction offending members.  
Define clear group boundaries 
This first principle, according to the internal community statute, seems to be quite 
clear with group boundaries very clearly explained. Within this statute there also appears 
a process for accepting outsiders into the community as full members; however, these 
new members need to agree to follow the rules and requirements of the community. 
According to the rules of the statute people who want to be incorporated in the 
community need to have the intention to work communally in the fields with no 
commercial purpose. As a community leader explained, “When people come here, if they 
are from another village and they want land to live on and work they will request this in 
an assembly. Yes, they will provide it, but they must agree to follow the rules of the 
community with taking advantage of the resources of the community.” 
Rules by community members and for community members 
The governing rules of the community that each member must follow are directly 
related to the common goods in order to manage, organize and control the land and 
society. These rules are agreed to by the people according to their necessities and 
situational context. Thus, these rules can be constantly in a state of change over time. 
Often rules are implemented, reformed, abandoned, and sometimes reused in the best 
interest of the community, as the theory of bricolage suggests. Furthermore, aside from 




small group in power, instead these rules are maintained by the constant participation of 
all the members of the community. This not only provides members with ability to 
change these rules to best fit their interest, but it also provides a platform for very real 
direct democracy in plenitude over the decisions made about the communal rules.  
Rule-making rights of community members are respected by outside 
authorities 
Both communities in this study are recognized by national law as peasant 
communities that rely on their own autonomy and administration over the land. In these 
processes of negotiation the stakeholders are the corporations, the state, and the 
communities. The Peruvian government in 1993, in middle of a heated national debate 
about land and resource rights, established that between the subsoil and the topsoil 
(surface) the land belongs to the communities that have long been established there, but 
below the subsoil, where most mined minerals are located, all resources officially belong 
to the state. Today, this means that the state government of Peru has control of the subsoil 
resources, while the topsoil resources are controlled and maintained by private and 
community land owners. This controversial situation has added to conflicts between 
external corporations, mostly mining and oil companies, and the indigenous people who 
have lived in the places where these resources exist for millennia. Ultimately, the changes 
wrought in 1993 by the state have made them the owners of everything in the subsoil and 




(Amado, 2010). As the result of these differing rights and interests the mining operations 
can lead to clientelism and manipulation. 
System to monitor and sanction offending community members 
As mentioned in the Results Chapter, the reciprocal community work such as ayni 
and minka has been dramatically abandoned by certain segments of the communities due 
to the mining operations. This has caused many changes to people’s behavior, including 
economic changes and work habit changes due to the influence of mining. The principles 
of common pool resource management (Ostrom, 1990) have thus been altered because of 
outsiders coming to the village for work, eventual corruption of the authorities, and final 
mistrust of the authorities by the community (See Table 15). The self-governance model 
thus required by the assembly was strained and this caused difficulty in the maintenance 
of community land management rules and norms. As evidenced by the conflict of 
Parajinos detailed in the Results chapter.  
The monitoring process, especially for land management, such as the use of a 
camayok as described in the Literature Review Chapter, is used to check the behavior of 
all community members and their belongings (e.g. animals, tools, water canals, etc.) as 
they are used on the communal lands. If there are abuses, the offending member will be 
sanctioned at the following village assembly. However, it is important to recognize that 
through time the traditional authorities have lost much of their respect and their ability to 
enforce and to organize and correct socially bad or impermissible behavior (e.g. theft, 




due to the inevitable influence of globalization, which allows connectivity of the villagers 
and migrant communities to new ideas and technology. In just a short time these changes 
have come to strongly influence village politics. Without any place of contestation or 
time to reflect on what values of the sanctions, rules, and conditions are that need to be 
maintained the question should be asked: how will land management change into the 
future due to the pressures of neoliberalism and mining?   
In sum, Ostrom’s common pool resource management principles fit well the 
model of land management and political structure of the communities in this research. 
However, these principles are changing rapidly in recent decades since the mining 
operation in these areas and as the lack of the capacity of the State to recognize and 
support communities has generated less trust and hope in the effectiveness of formal 
institutions (See Table 15). Furthermore, through this research comes the question about 
whether autonomous communities with communally held land can really exist into the 
coming future age of expanded neoliberalism without any political, administrative, or 
economic intervention by the government. Ostrom’s (2010) principles of polycentric 
governance and microsituational level analysis can help to illuminate generally how 
communities organize and manage their resources through building complex, interrelated, 
trusting relationships among members. This concept of “trust” within the framework of 
collective action theory is seen as highly important by Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 
(2010) and something the State needs to understand in order to recognize and include 
these communities’ rules and norms in the management of these commons. However, in 




control efficiently the resources and corporate responsibilities of international 
communities, does the community then need to assume these responsibilities? What 
requirements does the community need to do so?  
Table 15: Five attributes (Ostrom 2010) applied to mining negotiations with villages 






stake holders  
a) Affected communities’ (villages and 
locales) opinions should be heard, valued, 
and advocated for by the State when in 
negotiation with mining companies. 
b) State needs more effective formal 
institutions to work with local communities 
and regulate mining operations. 
Known 
reputations 




a) Encourage and facilitate the meeting of 
community members from previous mining 
operations when a new mine begins. 
b) Create more comprehensive and publicly 
available data on all mining operations in 
the country and provide it to new mining 
communities. 
High marginal 
per capita return 
Canon minero The canon minero should be reviewed for 
unequal distribution based on proximity to 
mine and economic status. 
Long term vision No plans for local 
manufacturing, all 
raw materials for 
export 
a) The State should implement laws that 
methodically convert Peru’s mercantilist 
economy into one of manufacturing, 
requiring certain quantities of raw material 
from foreign mining companies to be sold at 
a near-cost value to Peruvian manufacturers. 
b) Develop plans to maintain the traditional 
agricultural lifestyle and geography of the 
Andes as mining increases. 
Sanctions system Informal sanctions 
often go 
unrecognized by the 
State 
Develop further recognition of local 
sanctions against mining companies to deter 






Geographic Scale of Mining Consultation and CSR 
The negotiation process of the mining operation requires stakeholders’ 
participation that is often coerced by political and economic influences. As a result, the 
negotiation process relies on the favor of interest groups that often take advantage of this 
process. Furthermore, this kind of negotiation can end up embroiled in conflict and 
disagreement between different groups of interest. Thus, the communities are more 
vulnerable, and all actors benefit less from these types of compromised processes. In 
Muradian et al. (2003) the question is posed about the ideal geographic scale for mining 
negotiation participation. In addition, they make the prediction that, “...any method for 
decision making not relying mainly on local laypeople participation would likely prolong 
conflicts across time, increasing the probability of local violent protests and weakening 
local institutions” (Muradian et al. 2003, p. 790).  
This thesis research agrees with Muradian et al. (2003) that it is vitally important 
to consider primarily the views of villagers where the mine will be located. However, it 
also suggests that secondarily the surrounding villagers from neighboring villages that 
will be affected, and thirdly the locales from each of these villages that exists in the 
major populated cities around Peru, but principally Lima, should also be consulted in this 
process to assure “legitimized” acceptance of the outcome (Muradian et al. 2003). An 
example of this is the difference between Calcauso’s and Mollebamba’s negotiation 




In Calcauso the negotiation process was difficult and strained, but because of the 
accepted input of the village assembly, surrounding villages, and the migrant community 
the final decision was agreed upon in the summer of 2017.  This decision to allow the 
first phase of exploration has largely been viewed as “legitimate”, even though some 
people are still against the final decision as is evidenced by my research results. This, 
while in Mollebamba only the village assembly was consulted, leaving out the secondary 
circles (surrounding villages) and tertiary circles (locales) of influence and decision-
making in the negotiation process. This resulted in not only a bad deal for Mollebamba, 
but also the protest by surrounding villages at their assembly in 2008, and the land 
conflict at Parajinos in 2014, all described in the Results Chapter. Each time these 
conflicts appeared, Mollebamba had to halt the mining operations, consult with the 
surrounding villages and their own locale in Lima, and renegotiate the contract with the 
mine. This process took many years away from all the stakeholders’ time and efforts. It is 
yet to be seen whether Calcauso’s negotiation will be longer-lasting than initial 
negotiations by Mollebamba.  However; the prospect of accepting input from secondary 






Chapter 6: Limitations, Future Research and Conclusion 
As a member of these communities, I tried to develop a thesis that could give 
practical suggestions to the current situation surrounding negotiation with the mining 
companies. As a member of my community told me in the interview, the mining will 
happen, it could be now or later, but it will come eventually because these resources 
historically have been necessary for the society and industry. Many of them asked how I 
could help them in this situation and I thought that a key element of future success in this 
regard would be to first develop a greater understanding about their own political 
organization and function and how these organizations negotiate with the mining 
companies. This would then allow me to explore alternatives these communities might 
have to negotiate more beneficial deals with mining companies in the future.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
A limitation of this study was the lack of in-depth economic analysis of both 
formal and informal institutions and how people benefit or not from current mining 
policy. Because I did not obtain the raw financial records of profits, losses, and 
investments of the mining companies in these areas, it is difficult to tell how favorable 
these investments have been for them. Future economic research should focus on the 




mining) because this was a principal point of discussion among authors (Arellano, 2008; 
Zavalla, 2004; Hinojosa, 2011). 
Future research must also expand its geographic scope. Until now, most research 
has only focused on one or a handful of communities. A large-scale mixed-methods study 
in the future that compares various factors among many communities affected by mining 
would be extremely valuable for the field. In future, research could focus on health and 
nutrition, educational and socioeconomic improvement, the generation and gender gap in 
perspectives on mining and positions of authority in the communities, and the conditions 
under which families continue working the land successfully after mining companies 
arrive. These factors are important to analyze to understand and evaluate the significant 
changes that are taking place in these communities because of neoliberal mining 
practices.  
Moreover, research in the future should pay particular attention to the standard of 
living increase (or not) of communities affected by mining and the psychological pressure 
to modernize to understand the cost-benefit of mining operations for these communities 
(Norberg-Hodge, 1991). These types of studies are important because it is not yet clear 
that the outcome of development through neoliberal mining practices will necessarily 
ensure the well-being of the people and their socio-environmental context as compared 
with their own CPO. These topics should be investigated further by various fields of 
study to assure that the primary stakeholders, the villages and locales, are properly 
benefitting from the use of their land and resources in this manner. Specifically, future 




communities and reconciling them with effective formal institutions to provide proper 
CPR management that is accepted and administered by the local communities, especially 
in situations like mining where extraction takes so much investment of money and labor. 
If these major projects are going to happen either way, by following the attributes of 
microsituations explained by Ostrom (2010), formal institutions could learn how to 
properly incorporate local knowledge, authority, and decision-making within the 
framework of their development projects, this will ensure a more complimentary 
relationship between the informal and formal institutions of the region and thereby bring 







This thesis has attempted to show the influence of customary political 
organization (CPO) on the experiences of two indigenous Quechua communities as they 
negotiated entry of mining operations onto their lands and into their communities.  This 
study utilized grounded theory and a mixed-methods approach to obtain relevant data, 
and analyzed these data based on various theories and concepts by authors in the fields of 
indigenous studies, political science, environmental science, geography, and ecology.  
There were several main findings in this thesis. This included the unique structure of 
CPO in these communities and the differences between villages in the negotiation 
processes with mining companies.  These negotiations and mining in general were 
perceived differently according to the community demographics and impacted the 
resulting mining negotiations. The results highlighted the need for recognition of local 
knowledge and common pool resource (CPR) governance strategies by formal 
institutions in order to help create more effective connections with informal institutions. 
Of course, focusing on just increasing investments with a centralized state government 
without having enough control and regulation can have devastating consequences. In the 
Peruvian case, inefficiency of the State distribution programs for mining taxes makes the 
canon minero (taxes) often increase social conflicts rather than decrease them in the long 
term in the communities that are the most affected. These communities are in the first 




and in which conditions mining arrived in these communities and how the political 
organization of the community responded to these external actors through their 
customary organization. 
 These findings in the current study relatively concurred with those of Pejovich 
(1999) and Helmke and Levitsky (2004). This is in regard to the informal institutions and 
their role under effective or ineffective governance by the State, however it was 
important to add the concept of institutional bricolage (Cleaver, 2012; Rogers, 2012) to 
the analysis. Institutional bricolage suggested a more holistic approach to the 
understanding of “informal” and “formal” institutions, and how the State in the case of 
Peru could play a more active role in its protection and assistance to communities 
negotiating with large multinational mining companies. Furthermore, these findings 
identified the same four characteristics for indigenous peoplehood as suggested by 
Thomas (1990) and Holm et al. (2003) to be existing in these communities, even though 
the people there were largely unaware or misinformed about the word indigenous. Most 
importantly, this study recognized that the migrants who are not currently living in their 
traditional lands, but speak the Quechua language, participate in traditional festivities and 
ceremonies, and are connected to traditional history, are also included in this model of 
peoplehood. Ostrom’s (2008) eight principles for common pool resource management 
were also found to be present in these villages. Six of the eight principles were elaborated 
on while asking the question whether these communities need to assume a larger role in 
regulating multinational mining companies arriving in their communities due to the 




this research has suggested that not only should the primary village (or villages) affected 
by a mine be consulted in the negotiation process, but also the surrounding villages and 
their migrant communities. This should help ameliorate potential problems, equalize the 
benefits for all potential stakeholders, and ensure that after negotiations take place, there 
is less conflict due to a higher amount of legitimization of the process. This is achieved 
by including these important stakeholders as equal members at the negotiating table.  
This comparative case study explained the context of the expansion of the mining 
industry. Within the first phase of negotiation with the mining companies in these 
villages, without even having started the operation yet, it already has created immense 
social conflict. I highly suggest deeper study from the political comparative field to 
understand in which conditions the formal and informal rules play an important role in 
shaping their interaction with formal institutions, particularly focusing on the attributes of 
CPR management (Ostrom, E., 2010). I also urge future research into the importance of 
including migrant communities in some capacity at the negotiation table; in addition, the 
importance of the political organization of the migrant communities in urban areas and 
how they help shape the political structure in the village. This kind of network based 
primarily on family ties has emerged as a strong modern political force. This is due to the 
influence of migration and the self-determination and autonomy between villages and 
locales. The way in which they have controlled and managed their resources have guided 
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Appendix A: Pearson Correlation Results for Village Survey SPSS Analysis 
Dependent Variable Ind. Variables Pearson Correlation 
Do you identify as 
indigenous 
Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever 
lived in the city 0.283 
Have you ever had a 
position of authority in 
the village? 
Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever 
lived in the city 
0.328 | -.208 
How often Do you 
participate in the 
village assembly 
Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever 
lived in the city 
0.181 




Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever 
lived in the city 
0.21 
Villagers should have 
more political authority 
than residents in Lima 
over local politics 
Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever 
lived in the city 
-0.165 
Last Question: Row 3 
(Residents should 
participate in village 
politics) 
Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever 
lived in the city 
0.146 | -.165 
Last Question: Row 7 
(Village authorities 
work for the interest of 
the people)) 
Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever 
lived in the city 
0.13 
Last Question Row 1 
(Mining is a good 
opportunity for the 
community. 
Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever 
lived in the city 
.153 | -.151 
land titling is beneficial 
for the community 
Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever 
lived in the city -0.217 
Mining is the only form 
of development for the 
population 
Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever 
lived in the city 
0.173 
Mining causes social 
divisions in the 
community 
Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever 
lived in the city 





Appendix B: Pearson Correlation Results for Locale Survey SPSS Analysis 
Dependent Variable Ind. Variables Pearson Correlation 
Authorities work for 
the benefit of the 
village 
Gender, Age, Village of Origin 0.578 
12. If your answer is 





Gender, Age, Village of Origin -0.545 
14. Have you had a 
position of authority in 
the political 
organization of 
residents in the place 
where you are 
Gender, Age, Village of Origin -0.69 
20. Choose whether 
you 2 or 4 with the 
following statements. 
(9 alternative 
answers) [The mining 
operation is a good 
opportunity for our 
community] 
Gender, Age, Village of Origin -0.292 
Land Titling is 
beneficial for the 
community 
Gender, Age, Village of Origin .360 | .332 
Mine causes Social 
divisions 
Gender, Age, Village of Origin 0.318 
Participation in village 
assemblies 






Appendix C: Random Partcipant List 
Location: Research House Number: Location: Research House Number: 
Calcauso Interview 3 Mollebamba Interview 17 
Calcauso Interview 12 Mollebamba Interview 18 
Calcauso Interview 30 Mollebamba Interview 35 
Calcauso Interview 38 Mollebamba Interview 61 
Calcauso Interview 62 Mollebamba Interview 63 
Calcauso Interview 66 Mollebamba Interview 93 
Calcauso Interview 84 Mollebamba Interview 106 
Calcauso Interview 86 Mollebamba Interview 112 
Calcauso Interview 90 Mollebamba Interview 132 
Calcauso Interview 95 Mollebamba Interview 138 
Calcauso Interview 96 Mollebamba Interview 158 
Calcauso Interview 103 Mollebamba Interview 161 
Calcauso Interview 109 Mollebamba Interview 163 
Calcauso Interview 121 Mollebamba Interview 182 
Calcauso Interview 142 Mollebamba Interview 199 
Calcauso Survey 1 Mollebamba Survey 9 
Calcauso Survey 3 Mollebamba Survey 21 
Calcauso Survey 5 Mollebamba Survey 28 
Calcauso Survey 8 Mollebamba Survey 30 
Calcauso Survey 9 Mollebamba Survey 31 
Calcauso Survey 12 Mollebamba Survey 38 
Calcauso Survey 15 Mollebamba Survey 39 
Calcauso Survey 17 Mollebamba Survey 48 
Calcauso Survey 19 Mollebamba Survey 56 
Calcauso Survey 21 Mollebamba Survey 57 
Calcauso Survey 23 Mollebamba Survey 58 
Calcauso Survey 25 Mollebamba Survey 63 




Location: Research House Number: Location: Research House Number: 
Calcauso Survey 30 Mollebamba Survey 69 
Calcauso Survey 32 Mollebamba Survey 73 
Calcauso Survey 34 Mollebamba Survey 77 
Calcauso Survey 39 Mollebamba Survey 78 
Calcauso Survey 46 Mollebamba Survey 81 
Calcauso Survey 48 Mollebamba Survey 83 
Calcauso Survey 50 Mollebamba Survey 86 
Calcauso Survey 58 Mollebamba Survey 91 
Calcauso Survey 60 Mollebamba Survey 94 
Calcauso Survey 61 Mollebamba Survey 105 
Calcauso Survey 63 Mollebamba Survey 106 
Calcauso Survey 69 Mollebamba Survey 108 
Calcauso Survey 70 Mollebamba Survey 117 
Calcauso Survey 72 Mollebamba Survey 118 
Calcauso Survey 74 Mollebamba Survey 119 
Calcauso Survey 75 Mollebamba Survey 123 
Calcauso Survey 81 Mollebamba Survey 126 
Calcauso Survey 84 Mollebamba Survey 129 
Calcauso Survey 87 Mollebamba Survey 132 
Calcauso Survey 91 Mollebamba Survey 135 
Calcauso Survey 92 Mollebamba Survey 136 
Calcauso Survey 93 Mollebamba Survey 149 
Calcauso Survey 102 Mollebamba Survey 150 
Calcauso Survey 104 Mollebamba Survey 152 
Calcauso Survey 110 Mollebamba Survey 155 
Calcauso Survey 111 Mollebamba Survey 156 
Calcauso Survey 115 Mollebamba Survey 157 
Calcauso Survey 120 Mollebamba Survey 164 




Location: Research House Number: Location: Research House Number: 
Calcauso Survey 129 Mollebamba Survey 178 
Calcauso Survey 131 Mollebamba Survey 180 
Calcauso Survey 134 Mollebamba Survey 182 
Calcauso Survey 136 Mollebamba Survey 183 
Calcauso Survey 138 Mollebamba Survey 190 
Calcauso Survey 139 Mollebamba Survey 194 
Calcauso Survey 146 Mollebamba Survey 196 






Appendix D: National Statistical Service Sample Size Calculator 
 
